dered as a protection from mischief, which hung over us, or as a means of offence and of coercing the nations to do us justice. It is now certain that it was laid when Great Britain meditated an entire interdiction of our commerce with the continent of Europe, and the manner of doing it was altogether uncertain. Whether she would adopt her former method of sweeping our vessels without notice, or whether she would pretend some regard to justice in the manner of doing us injury, was uncertain. It seems from her conduct in this respect, and that in relation to the Chesapeske, which will be noticed by and bye, that she hoped to reconcile the United States to the operation of her orders in council, or at least, that those who had been more particularly friendly to her in the United States, might be saved to her by some attention to the manner of operating upon us. She accordingly, in the terms of her orders, in this case, gave time for the vessels actually at sea to return; but experience proves all measures of this kind unavailing, for cruizers in the commencement of hostilities always anticipate war and provide for a state of things which will justify every seizure. Accordingly we are informed that scarcely any of the vessels which sailed in the month the embargo was laid, ever returned.

As a measure for extorting justice both from Great Britain and France, it seems to me the best our situation afforded, and as likely to succeed as any that nations ever resort to. The measures of each nation shewed a solicitude to preserve the commerce of the United States to itself, while they deprived their enemy of it; the situation of both made that commerce necessary. France and her dependencies, powerful as she was, could procure the articles of India produce, which had become part of the ordinary support of her people, only by our commerce. Her few remaining colonies could be supplied with provisions with certainty from no other quarter and, during the war with Great Britain, she could, if at war with us, do us no injury. The want of our commerce would be a state of suffering without any palliative, but what she might find in the suffering of her enemy. This, the federalists know from experience, contrary to their first expectations on this subject, will not reconcile men used to indulgence to any great privation. In short it was the only measure by which we could reach France or injure her.

Great Britain, a commercial and manufacturing nation, depending on foreign markets, and existing merely by the credit of her resources, was deprived of almost every other open market than the United States, and the people of the United States were the only ones who could possibly find admittance for her manufactures with her enemies. Add to this that many articles absolutely necessary for her shipping and manufactures were to be procured no where else, and the least failure in her crop would make all the supply the United States could afford necessary to her support. The loss to the people of Ireland of the article of flax seed, was so important that it could not fail to create great sensation. In short, the loss of our commerce would be felt in so many different parts that it could scarcely fail of producing a strong national feeling. No assistance from government could long keep their people at work, when the articles of indispensible use in their business could not be procured. A war with Great Britain would not be so injurious to her, if we traded with the rest of the world, for she might calculate on capturing a great proportion of what we should ship. It was a fortunate expedient for making war upon both nations at once, a thing very difficult in any other way.

The first effect of the embargo when fairly put to the trial, by giving the President power to rescind it, as to either nation that should return to good treatment of us, corresponded with the just expectations formed from it. According to our minister's information, the offer was listened to with pleasure by Mr. Canning, and after repeated interviews Mr. C. went so far as to say he expected to have something to communicate to him for his government of a very pleasing nature. This prospect was immediately overcast, but by causes so strongly marked, that they cannot be mistaken. Intelligence of the open revolt of the Spaniards was received, and an arrival from the United States brought intelligence, that the elections in Massachusetts, and indeed throughout New-England, had proved unfriendly to the embargo policy, and that there were serious apprehensions of open resistance to the law. These changed Mr. Canning's tone from accommodation to insult; heightened, as I have shewn, the pretensions of Great Britain, against the rights of neutrals, and brought out that domineering spirit against us, which has invariably shewn itself in every favorable state of her continental affairs.

No way was left for the determined opposers of our government and its measures, and the as uniform supporters of Great Britain, but to discredit the opinions and representations of our minister. This man has held a higher standing in his state, than any man of his age ever did in the United States. He had been sent to Great Britain (as a federalist) a commissioner under Jay's treaty, was afterwards associated with Mr. Munroe, in negociating the treaty which was rejected, and after his return, became our minister at London. He had possessed a very high standing in the confidence of federalists, had shewn every disposition to preserve friendship with G. Britain, and had done nothing to bring his patriotism into question, but serving under our administration, and shewing an approbation of the embargo. It was openly denied, on these sole grounds, that he was a federalist, and as soon as that was established, he became a mark for defamation. The federalists discovered in this and some other remarkable instances, that they had intrenched both their heads and their hearts, so as to keep them steady as to their party interests. If a man, let his standing among them have been what it would, decided against their general sentiment and conduct, he was no longer a federalist, and if not a federalist he was not entitled to belief or respect. In Mr. Pinkney's case you all recollect how greedily they seized an occasion to circulate (if they did not publish) Mr. Canning's second letter of the 23d of Sept. intended to give a different appearance to the informal meetings between Mr. Pinkney and Mr. Canning from that he (Mr. P.) gave to our government. Fortunately the letter carried marks upon it which could not be mistaken, and shewed that it was written to save Mr. Canning and his nation from the ridicule, which would certainly be incurred by his vaunting letter of the same date, when it came to be compared with the humble and peace-making appearance they exhibited in the informal conversations with Mr. Pinkney. A second answer to the same letter in diplomatic affairs, where the first had been written with so much labor and delay, and that too to correct mistatements of facts, is wholly without example. Incorrectness in matter of fact claims the first attention always, but could not possibly have been overlooked for so long a time as Mr. Canning delayed his answer. It was certainly produced by some sudden alarm, which he felt after parting with the letter, which filled the hearts of the federalists with so much pleasure, by its suspected pity, its sarcasm and insinuation against the government of their country, that all doubt on this subject, if there ever was doubt, is now removed by the complete fulfilment of a prediction of Mr Pinkney's founded on his accurate view of what was passing. In his private letter to Mr. Madison, communicated to Congress and dated 21st Sept. 1808, after discussing and enforcing at large the policy of continuing the embargo he says, "On the other hand, if we persevere we must gain our purpose at last. By complying with the little policy of the moment we shall be lost. By a great and systematic adherence to principle, we shall find the end to our difficulties The embargo and the loss of our trade are deeply felt here, and will be felt with more severity every day. The wheat harvest is likely to be alarmingly short and the state of the continent will augment the evil. The discontents among their manufacturers, are only quieted for a moment by temporary causes. Cotton is rising and soon will be scarce. Unfavorable events in the continent, will subdue the temper unfriendly to wisdom & justice, which now prevails here. But above all, the world, I trust, will be convinced that our firmness is not to be shaken. Our measures have not been without effect. They have not been decisive, because we have not been thought capable of persevering in self-denial, if that can be called self-denial, which is no more than prudent abstinence from destruction and dishonor."

When I examine the causes which have led to the settlement with G. B. this will appear to be as accurate a prediction of what has happened as could be made and will establish the accuracy of its author at the same time it will place the widsom and policy of the embargo on the highest possible ground.

I come now in the order of my subject to the enquiry what it was that produced the overture from Great Britain. For this purpose it will be necessary to ascertain her claims upon the United States and the design with which her measures were adopted and how far those claims have been yielded to. You have seen from the note annexed to the treaty that Great Britain formed an expectation of us, that we should resist the operation of the decree in all its parts; that we should insist upon a right to force British manufactures into France and upon the right of our ships to trade between British & French ports, as much as we were bound to insist on our right to navigate the high seas. The quotation I have made from Mr. Canning's late speech in Parliament shews their orders in council were intended to repel the *whole* war made upon British commerce, and the speeches of the other members of the ministry in the two houses declare the distinction which I have set up between the parts of the Berlin decree to be a collusion with France on our part. From this it is clear, that they adhered to the first claim made on the United States under the Berlin decree, that we should resist its whole operation.

On the offer of our government to take off the embargo to Great Britain if she would revoke her orders in council, Mr. Canning produces a full length portrait of his country, which will aid us very much in our enquiries. After stating the attempt to ruin Great Britain through her commerce, he strongly insinuates that the United States were parties to scheme. He declares that the events in Spain had rendered "the universal combination utterly harmless & contemptible," but still "that the reputation of G. B." a reputation which he says, "constitutes a great part of her power, requires that no concession should be made which can be considered as contributing to disappoint the plans of her enemies, that not a doubt should remain to distant times of her determination and ability to have continued her resistance; and that no step which could be mistakenly construed into concession should be taken on her part while the smallest link of the confederacy remains undissolved or while it can be a question whether the plan devised for her destruction has or has not either completely failed or been unequivocally abandoned." He concludes this rant by declaring that these considerations compel his majesty to adhere to the principles of the orders in council, *so long as France adheres to the system which occasioned them.* He declares that he anticipates from the result of the present misunderstanding a pledge of the long continuance of good undertanding between the two countries, as it will be firmly established that Great Britain is not jealous of the prosperity of the United States, and that an intercourse with them is not necesssary to her existence.

(To be Continued.)

WASHINGTON CITY.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 15.

Mr. Secretary Smith received on the 14th inst. from Mr. Erskine a long and *very satisfactory* letter in answer to one of the 9th inst in which Mr. Smith had respectfully requested a candid explanation, as to the conversations, which Mr. Canning's despatch of the 23d of January had imputed to Mr. Madison, Mr. Gallatin and himself.

Mr. Erskine has, moreover, in this letter, stated the reasons, which, in the exercise of the discretion given him, had induced him not to lay his instructions before the government of the U. States.

These papers will, no doubt, be communicated in due time to Congress.

There is the strongest reason to believe that the note of Mr. Canning of the 24th of May was not framed as a guide to Mr. Erskine, or with a view to its being communicated to our government, so much as with a view to publication at a proper season to produce an unjust impression of the sentiments of our government and the disposition of his own. Had certain events occurred this celebrated note would never have seen the light. Not having occurred, it is ushered to the public as proof positive of the firm and unwavering conduct of the British ministry and of the pusillanimity of our government! Whatever the catastrophe may be, it is calculated that the plot will answer for a short period. It will in England completely gull the public credulity, and even in this country, to our reproach it must be acknowledged, it will operate to a certain extent as a firebrand of discord. Until the full correspondence is unveiled we must consider the fact of Mr. Erskine's not having communicated this dispatch, or having acted under it, as evidence of the existence of other instructions of a different complexion. But, in the mean time, while the public curiosity and interest are most alive, this is the only paper published. In England it will have the temporary effect of giving popularity to the ministry, by the appearance of firmness on their part, connected with the great gains of her merchants and manufacturers. Although this last result be strictly the result of the arrangements made by Mr. Erskine, which his government disavows, it has, nevertheless, taken special care to reap the full harvest; and Mr. Canning has probably calculated that the ultimate award of his constituents will be in proportion to the success of his measures, without a nice discrimination with regard to its causes. If the depredations committed on our trade (for they do not merit a milder epithet) under the terms of the disavowal, enrich the English merchant and manufacturer, enable them to resume the activity of their occupations, by purchasing the goods of the former and furnishing raw-materials to the latter, and furnish the government with naval supplies so essential to its vigorous career, if they supply the fund for new taxes or loans to aid the operations of Spain and Austria, Mr. Canning doubtless concludes that this breach of good faith towards a rival and a republic will, amidst the blaze of triumph and the intoxication of prosperity, be viewed as a mere peccadillo, if not as an accomplished stratagem. If pressed hard, he will conjure up the plea of necessity, and shew that the very existence of his country depended upon the measures resorted to, and he will demand to know of what value the feelings or character of an individual are, compared with the salvation of a nation. If on the contrary, all his gay hopes of triumph and victory fade away, and he and his co adjutors are driven from the royal cabinet by the clamors of a distracted people, this feature in their conduct, it will be presumed, will challenge but little regard amidst the other numerous invasions of principle and justice. The nation too will be likely to be satisfied with their fall, and in the hope of better times look forward instead of backward. The whole conduct of the present English ministry shews that they hazard every thing on a successful issue, realising that it is neck or nothing with them.

We republish the following article from the National Intelligencer of the 2d of September last, as evincing the degree of credit due to the assertions of Mr. Canning. Those, who wish to prosecute the enquiry, may consult several subsequent articles in the same print on the same head. It is high time that the character of this man should be understood in this country.

Mr. Canning's Speech.—We inserted in our paper of Friday Mr. Canning's remarks on the existing state of the relations between this country and Great Britain. They embrace several topics; the affair of the Chesapeake, the orders in Council, and generally the alleged amicable disposition of the British administration to the United States; all of which are treated in such a way as to excite the astonishment of any one in the least acquainted with the situation of the two countries. Whatever may have been the intention of the minister, the use made of his allegations on this side of the Atlantic is such as might well have been foreseen. They are every where republished, with copious commentaries, by the enemies of the administration, on the eve of several important elections, to shew its culpable supineness or partiality, and to palliate, if not to justify, the temper of the British cabinet. We may shortly take occasion to notice somewhat in detail the several topics adverted to by Mr. Canning; at present we propose to confine our remarks to that part of his observations which applies most pointedly to the conduct of our government relative to the orders in Council. These are as follow:

"SIR—*Since the return of* Mr. Rose, *no communication has been made by the American government,* in the form of complaint, or remonstrance, or irritation of any description whatever. I mention this particularly, because it is notorious that there have been several arrivals from America, supposed to be of great importance, and that several special messengers have reached this country from thence, after having touched at France. But, sir, if the honorable gentleman, in execution of his public duty, had thought fit to move for any communications that had been made by the American government, *since the departure of Mr. Rose,* my answer must have been, not that his majesty's government were disinclined to make them, but that absolutely there were none to make. If it be asked 'why,' I am unable satisfactorily to reply; I can conjecture, that America has entered into negociations with France, which are expected to lead to some result, and that the communications of America to this country are to be contingent on that result. This, sir, is conjecture alone, but it is founded on the extraordinary circumstance of so many arrivals without any communications."

This part of Mr. Canning's remarks requires the most distinct notice, as it is made the foundation of a charge against our government, of evincing a criminal indifference to the restoration of harmony with England by withholding all remonstrance to her government on the orders of Council; while it is more than insinuated that repeated remonstrances have been made to the French government: We pronounce this charge a gross and palpable falsehood, and aver that the measure, either of remonstrance or of action, has been equally and impartially dealt out to both governments. The fact is, that no important aggression on neutral rights has been perpetrated by either France or England without immediate and strenuous remonstrance on the part of our government. The fact is, that with respect to every such aggression, an uniform sentiment has been felt, and an invariable course pursued. When injured, no matter by which nation, redress has been demanded for the wrong, and security against its repetition. The documents published prove this to have been the case down to a late period, and those, which in all probability will be submitted to Congress at their next session, will equally prove it down to the present moment.

To substantiate our allegations beyond the reach of controversy, we shall proceed to specify some of the grounds on which they are made. If they bear hard upon the honor, the veracity or the delicacy of Mr. Canning, it will not be our fault; but that either of himself or his reporter. We shall be perfectly satisfied with understanding that the facts asserted by him, or the impression which the artful structure of the terms in which they are couched is fitted to make, are surreptitious. We shall in the mean time demonstrate either the falsehood of the facts, or of the impression evidently intended to be produced.

The celebrated British orders bear date the 11th, but were not promulged until the 17th of November last. For some days, however, previous to their publication in the Gazette, a general rumor prevailed that some such measure was on the eve of adoption, and the American merchants, consequently, took the alarm. So strong was this rumor that Mr. Pinkney, our minister at London, deemed it his duty to wait on Mr. Canning, and he accordingly did wait on him on the 11th of November, the very day on which the orders were signed, to enquire with regard to the correctness of the rumor, and to remonstrate, in such case, against the contemplated measure. Mr. Pinkney did not succeed in seeing Mr. Canning, but he saw the under secretary Hammond, to whom he communicated the leading considerations that offered themselves to his mind against the orders. Mr. Hammond neither admitted or denied that a measure was either taken or contemplated, thereby studiously concealing from Mr. Pinkney the fact, as if with the express and deliberate purpose of preventing remonstrance against it, until remonstrance should be too late. But Mr. Pinkney did, notwithstanding, remonstrate against it, not merely with a view to protest against a measure actually taken, but to prevent its being taken. But the die was already cast, and he found to his surprise, a few days after, that the fatal act had been consummated, the Rubicon had been passed, on the very day of his interview, without the least notice or opportunity for explanation or remonstrance.

On the 17th of November the orders appeared in the Gazette in form. Such a marked indignity had been offered to his country by this gigantic outrage on her rights without the least notice or explanation, that Mr. Pinkney might justly have shrouded himself in a proud silence. He might have disdained remonstrance to a government that thus levelled a deadly blow at the prosperity of a nation she called her friend, without apology or notice. But feeling profoundly the deep responsibility of his station as the representative of a pacific nation, he determined to control his feelings, and by making a manly appeal to the justice and magnanimity of the British government, attempt to awaken them to a sense of their interests, and a respect for our rights. This appeal, this *remonstrance,* was made without delay to Mr. Canning on the 21st of November, in an interview with him. While Mr. Pinkney was preparing his remonstrance, Mr. Canning asked an interview, when Mr. Canning said he had requested to see him, *not with the intention of discussing the general propriety of the orders, for they being now adopted, discussion could answer no valuable purpose, but with the view of explaining such of their provisions as might be supposed to be liable to misconstruction.*

Thus was the door forcibly closed by Mr. Canning upon all explanation, or remonstrance, by the unqualified