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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER.

In the 5th volume of Carey's Museum we find a series of pieces relative to a commercial treaty with Great Britain, written by *James M'Henry* in the year 1784. As they involve a discussion of topics now before the public, and furnish some important facts, we lay the most pertinent parts before our readers. It may be proper to remark that the writer has the character of being a decided federalist, and is the same gentleman who, under a former administration, held the station of Secretary of war.

Observations relative to a commercial treaty with Great Britain, &c. &c. &c. written in 1784. By James M'Henry, esq.

TO THE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES.

NUMBER II.

TO determine whether America is in a situation to enforce a liberal treaty of commerce with Great Britain, it will be necessary to investigate. I. The dependence of the West India islands on the United States; and II. What articles the United States can import from other countries, cheaper than from G. Britain. Should we find from this enquiry, that the West India islands cannot be maintained in a prosperous situation, without the supplies of the United States, and that England cannot furnish the United States with the bulk of our European imports, upon as advantageous terms as they can be had from other countries, it will prove—that America may reasonably expect, or honorably enforce a treaty upon equal and liberal principles.

I. The dependence of the West India islands on the United States. Whoever has considered, or will sit down and consider, the relative situation of these states and the West India islands, must be convinced, that nature has formed a connexion between them, which politicians cannot destroy. But, if the subject is pursued through their wants and productions, it will be further perceived, that to the strong connexion of nature, is added the indissoluble cement of interest. The West India planters and merchants were fully sensible of this truth, when they represented to lord North, that "the dominions of the United States of America, and his majesty's sugar colonies, having been settled in the express view of supplying each other's wants, it cannot be expected that the sugar colonies can subsist in any degree of prosperity without those supplies of lumber and provisions from America at the cheapest rate, in contemplation of which they were so settled, or without the consumption in North America of their produce in return." And, although lord North rejected the prayer of this remonstrance, yet he confessed to the world the truth of its principle, when the administration permitted a trade between the U. S and the islands, by means of British vessels. Could they have subsisted without our supplies and our consumption of their produce, this privilege would have been withheld; because its operation is to check the growth and increase of their American colonies. The proclamation, therefore, alone is conclusive that our supplies and consumption are deemed essential at least to their prosperity.

Some objections made by Cincinnatus, against preventing British ships from being the carriers of West India produce to the U. States, and the growth of the U. States to the West Indies, till such time as this carrying trade shall be made common to the ships of both nations, come very naturally under this article: "Great Britain," Cincinnatus says, "has long paid a bounty on the exportation of her corn, which with other articles, she may easily send to her islands instead of foreign countries." I will not suspect this writer of a design to mislead; I will rather suppose him ignorant, that the exportation of grain from England is forbidden, after it has risen a certain price,* or that with her immense bounties, she has not been able, in a period of sixty-eight years, (from 1697, to 1765,) to export, on an average, in any one year, above four hundred and eighty seven thousand four hundred and eleven quarters of grain which includes barley, malt, rye, and wheat.† Whereas I appears from authentic documents that the annual consumption of her W. India islands only, is equal to sixty thousand barrels of rice, four hundred thousand bushels of corn, and one hundred and forty thousand barrels of bread and flour. On the other hand, the single port of Philadelphia has exported in one year (1773) one hundred and eighty two thousand three hundred and ninety one bushels of wheat, two hundred and sixty-five thousand nine hundred and sixty nine barrels of flour, forty eight thousand one hundred and three barrels of bread, and one hundred and seventy nine thousand two hundred and twelve bushels of Indian corn; and Maryland in the same space of time, (between the 5th of January 1773, and the 5th of January 1774,) eighty four thousand five hundred barrels of flour, ten thousand, three hundred and thirty-three barrels of bread, four thousand five hundred bushels of rye, two hundred and sixty-six thousand bushels of wheat, and two hundred and thirty three thousand bushels of Indian and all this without bounty, or any aid from government; while the bounties Great Britain has expended in the abovementioned period, amount to six millions fifty eight thousand nine hundred and sixty two pounds sterling.‡ These facts serve to shew how inadequate England is to the proposed supply of the islands, or to enter into competition with a country, where the general crop may be said never to fail, and which is capable of the greatest augmentation.

It is further observed by this writer, that "Ireland will contribute largely to supply the wants of the British West Indies." We shall not deny that Ireland can furnish them with beef, but it is a known fact, that Ireland does not raise wheat enough for her own consumption, and that for a series of years, she had supplies from these United States; that she still demands these supplies; and that it is not very probable that she will make encroachments on her flax and pasturage grounds for the sake of raising wheat to supply the islands. But it is no less true, that the United States can also furnish the West India islands with beef. Cincinnatus subjoins three other sources of supplies; "Canada, Nova Scotia, and St. John's, may very soon be enabled to make up the deficiency, more especially, if by our prohibitions we force their growth and increase." With respect to Nova Scotia, its wheat and flour was drawn from America, and the probability is, that the supply must yet go from the same quarter. As to St. John's, it is out of the question; it may perhaps support its own inhabitants, but will never supply the West Indies. Canada, then, is the only British colony from which a supply is to be expected: but to this supply, besides absolute incompetency, there are two insurmountable obstacles. 1st. Flour does not keep in the West Indies, upon on average, above six weeks. 2dly. The navigation with Canada is open, *communibus annis*, but about twenty weeks in the year; to these two we might add, that a voyage from Quebec to the islands, generally employs twice the time of a voyage from the United States. From these facts it is evident, that the colonies cannot supply the islands; that the deficiency cannot be made up from Great Britain; and lastly, that to save them from the calamities of famine, or spoiled and rotten provisions, application must be made to the United States, who are alone able to supply them, at a price necessary to their prosperity, regularly, and efficaciously.‡

It was too visible to avoid observation, that this idea of Great Britain supplying her islands, is borrowed from the ministerial pamphlet of which we have already spoken,§ and makes by far the most fanciful part of the system. It is, however, a necessary part, without which the whole fabric must have fallen to pieces. Let us suppose for the sake of argument, the nature of the soil and climate of the British colonies—the number, industry and spirit of their inhabitants—the encouragement of England and the prohibitions of America, all in action, to force their growth and increase, and then ask these gentlemen to be candid and tell us in what number of years they really think they could accomplish what they assert them capable of doing. To this question the ministerial pamphlet is silent; but we are answered by Cincinnatus with a grave face and apprehensive expression—"very soon." This very soon however is very indefinite; and for aught Cincinnatus has said, explanatory of the exact time, "very soon" may comprehend a series of years long enough for America to starve the British islands. The experiment of a prohibition is too delicate and dangerous not to awaken Great Britain to a sense of the most alarming consequences. Small shocks are often fatal to a kingdom in its decline, that would scarcely have been felt in its vigor. Her manufactures are too generally rivalled, or undersold for her to add to their prices, by endeavoring to supply her islands independant of these states; her expences and income too nicely balanced to risk an increase of the one or a diminution of the other. A failure in the exports of the islands would be instantly felt by the revenue; an attempt to increase her exports of provisions would raise the price of living and labor, and fall upon her manufactures, whose prosperity are inseparable from the existence of the nation. But these considerations aside, is it the policy of Great Britain, tamely and without an effort, to see the current of the American consumption trade settling wholly into the French islands, which must happen, unless our system is assimilated by acts of reciprocity? For it is already known, that the French can supply us with sugar and other articles much cheaper than the English. Agreeably to the reasoning of Cincinnatus, she ought by all possible means to guard against our running into this trade, least, having once found the channel, we should not be easily brought to relinquish it.

There is another objection by Cincinnatus, which I shall consider in this place. By a temporary exclusion of British vessels from our carrying trade, he imagines we may deprive "ourselves of the best and almost only mart for our produce." To this it might be sufficient to answer that we cannot be deprived of their market, *indirectly* if we choose it: our merchants could have told him, had he consulted them, that the neutral islands will take large quantities of our produce, and independant of these or any West India exports—that the Mediterranean; Spain; Portugal; the wine islands; Germany; Holland and other countries open a ready market equal to the whole of our former exports to the British islands; while with these exports, we may bring back many articles of consumption, we were lately obliged to take at second hand and an advanced price from Great Britain.

From this view of the subject, then, shall we hesitate to pronounce—what America has in her power—what of right she ought to expect, and what measures she ought to pursue.

It is now to be examined, II. what articles the United States can import cheaper from other countries than from Great Britain. This being a question of individual as well as national profit or loss, and affecting the husbandman and manufacturer not less than the merchant, the balance is sedulously to be sought, and if found in our favor, tenaciously to be retained, or not lightly given up. To place it in its true light, it will be necessary to enter into a fair, separate, and candid enumeration of articles; but as this would take up too much of this paper, I shall reserve the detail for another, which will be the last, and close the present with a few general observations.

There are two avenues through which America may rouse the good sense of Great Britain; the one we have pointed out to be her West India islands, which have been laid hold of by Virginia, who has been imitated by Jersey in the resolution censured by Cincinnatus. The other which is yet more important—is her manufactures, of which we are about to speak. It is certainly more the interest and also more in the power of the United States to do without English manufactures now than during the war. During the war it was our interest to take our goods from such places as offered them to us at the least risk, and this unavoidably continued us in the use of British manufactures. Now it is our interest, to take our goods where we can get them cheapest, the risk being done away; of course we ought to confine our imports from Great Britain to such articles only, as she can sell cheaper than her neighbors or other nations, especially whilst our custom for other articles is to remain without an equivalent. We have obtained a range of markets as large as our wishes, and the cheapest must soon be universally known. We already behold rising into general notice large houses from France, Germany and Holland. These houses, inasmuch as their assortments will be completed from such markets as sell cheaper than England, will be able to undersell our merchants. Much therefore it behoves England to mark the progress of these houses, and much it behoves our merchants to attend to their orders for British goods, lest they should bring on their own country distress, and on themselves bankruptcy and ruin—the difference alone between the prices of most of the articles she formerly exported to America, and their prices in other countries now open to our trade, is of itself evidence clear enough, that we ought not to give her our commerce without an equivalent. But, alas, the British administration grasp at the exclusive trade of America, even without a treaty—so certain are they, to quote their own words, that "it will not be an easy matter to bring the American states to act as a nation," that "they are not be feared as such," for "a stamp act, a tea act, or such act that can never again occur, could alone unite them." Blind to the future, these political prophets do not perceive that their proceedings are operating as a stampt act, and *bringing the United States to act as a nation.*"

March 6, 1784.

* *I am well informed, that the grain imported into England during the last year, amounted to above one million sterling.*

† *See three tracts on the corn trade and corn laws.*

‡ *The supplies of the British West Indies were derived during the war from the United States, by captures and through neutral islands.*

§ *Lord Sheffield's.*

NOTICE.

Subscribers in arrears are respectfully requested to make immediate payment, otherwise their papers will be discontinued.

Nov. 6, 1805.

RAGS.

The highest price, in *Cash or Books* will be given for any quantity of clean linen and Cotton RAGS, by Rapine Conrad and Co. Capitol Hill.

June 24—

[*FROM THE BATAVIAN STATE GAZETTE.*]

HAGUE, SEPT. 7.

"In several Journals an opinion has been propagated, and perhaps on too vague grounds, that the preparations of the House of Austria had no other object than an armed neutrality, and the protection of her frontier. This opinion to us does not appear very political, and by no means as proceeding from a good source, and that for the following reasons:

"Austria is a power of the first rank; she has a strong and well disciplined army, celebrated all over Europe. The resources which she possesses are immense; she has a population of upwards of twenty five million: her army in time of peace is sufficient to maintain internal good order, and to instil fear into all who would disturb her tranquility.

"Then who durst, in the present situation of affairs, provoke Austria in such a manner, that preparations for war should become necessary for her? Has, perhaps, Russia demanded, in a commanding tone a passage for her troops, to lead them to Italy, or the Rhine? This is improbable. Has France, on her part, demanded a similar passage, to march her armies to the North? This is impossible to conceive. Besides, France wishes nothing so much as to remain at peace on the Continent, in order to bend all her force against England.

"A power then, which prepares for war, without necessity, which says, that she does so from precaution for the preservation of her tranquility, must (at least this way of reasoning agrees better with probability) have other motives and other objects. Time will develope those objects; time will shew how far the influence of English gold extends.

"More reasonable and probable appears another armed neutrality, which is already considered as existing; namely, that of Prussia, Denmark, and the Electors of the German Empire. The territories of Prussia adjoin both those of Sweden and of Russia; and, perhaps the former power would not do wrong, to put herself, at the same time, in a state of defence against the two others, and against the British navy which will not fail to assist them. Thus would Prussia, with great foresight, have sought a support in a league with Denmark and the Electors, who are all interested in preserving the peace of the German Empire. Denmark, a flourishing kingdom, which Sweden and England view with emulation, and which possesses sufficient boldness not to suffer Russia to over-rule her, will also, with good policy, have sought the assistance of the Prussian and Electoral armies, to render her commerce, her territory, and her tranquility secure.

"The same opinion may be applied to the Electors. The second armed neutrality then is more reasonable, more probable, and perhaps the only one that will take place."

STATE OF EUROPE.

From a London print.

A German writer has just published an interesting article on the state of the powers of Europe; and the following is the substance of it, as given in the Courant of Mentz:

At the commencement of the war of the French Revolution, which must be considered as the cause of those changes which have produced the present situation of Europe, Russia possessed a territory of 300,000 sq. miles, a population of 26 millions, and a revenue of 7 millions of Louis d'Or.

The territory of Austria was 11,149 sq. miles, her population 25 millions, and her revenue 4 millions of Louis d'Or.

Prussia had a territory of 3,500 sq. miles, a population of 6 millions, and a revenue of 4 millions of Louis d'Or.

The remaining territories of the German empire comprized an extent of 12,000 sq. miles, contained 26 millions of inhabitants, and produced a revenue of 9 millions of Louis d'Or.

The territory of Great-Britain was then estimated at 6,036 sq. miles, the population at 9 millions, and the revenue at 17 millions of Louis d'Or.

Russia has gained a territory of 7,035 sq. miles, a population of 5 millions, and an increase of revenue equal to 3 millions of rix dollars, by her last acquisitions in Poland only. This is entirely independent of her late acquisitions in Asia, America and the Adriatic, of her conquest of the Crimea, and of what she obtained by the former partition of Poland in 1772.

Austria lost by the cession of the Netherlands only 474 sq. miles, 1,500,000 inhabitants, and a revenue of 8 millions of guilders; and in all, by the cession of Lombardy, Frickthal, the Brisgau and Artenau, without reckoning the county of Falkenstein, 673 sq. miles, 2,639,700 subjects, and 9,125,663 florins of revenue. She has gained by the acquisition of Venetian Istria and Dalmatia, independent of the bishropic of Trent and Brixen, 500 sq. miles.—Her population is therefore neatly the same as it was before the war.

Prussia lost about 42 sq. miles of territory, 172,137 inhabitants, and a revenue of 128,249 Louis d'Or. She acquired by the partition of Poland, 2,058 sq. miles, and 2,075,700 inhabitants; besides, by the addition of Hildesheim, Paterhorn, Ersutt, Eichsfeldt, Munster, &c. Some statistical accounts make the present territory of the Prussian states amount to 6000 sq. miles, the population to 9,000,000, and the revenue to 6 millions of Louis d'Or; but this estimate is rather exaggerated.

The acquisitions of England cannot at present be easily estimated, as her possessions are daily increasing, and she may be said to keep equal pace with Russia as to acquisitions. Her Indian possessions are extensive and of an incalculable value; but her principal power arises out of her commerce, and the industry of her population.

France possessed before the war, 10,000 sq. miles, 26 millions of inhabitants, and 19 millions of Louis d'Or of revenue. She now possesses 12,160 sq. miles, 32 millions of population and 24 millions of revenue. Her principal acquisitions are—

	sq. miles	*Inhab.*
Savoy	83	280,000
Nice	52	95,000
Piedmont	585	2,357,000
Belgium, and the department on the Rhine	1200	3,900,000
Genoa	90	350,000

There are, besides, immediately under the dominions of France, Parma, Placenza, and Gustella, with a population of 250,000; and the kingdom of Italy with a territory of 784 sq. miles, and 3,360,000 inhabitants, without taking Lucca and Piombino into the account. It must, however, still be considered that France can dispose of her allies, and also of other neighboring states as she pleases; that Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, the greater part of Italy not included in Bonaparte's kingdom, Holland, and a considerable portion of Germany, are under her control; the power of that empire is therefore immense.

Spain has a territory of 9,277 sq. miles, and 10 million of inhabitants—Holland possesses a territory of 625 sq. miles, with 2,500,000 inhabitants; and both powers are directly dependent upon France. If, therefore, we include all the states, mediately or immediately, under the dominion of France, we shall find that she has at her disposal a population equal to 50 million.

LONDON, SEPT. 9—16.

The following particulars are given in a private letter from Paris of 25th ult—"Count Cobentzel had yesterday a conference with Talleyrand, which lasted 5 hours, after which he dispatched a courier to Vienna. He has since made arrangements, indicating the near approach of his departure from this capital. A continental war is considered here as inevitable, and excites no slight murmurs and discontent. The agents of the Pope, however, assert that its duration will not exceed three months, as the Emperor of the French will before Christmas, dictate at Vienna a peace to the Emperor of Austria, and as successor to Charlemagne and the Imperial German Diadem to the Crowns of Italy and France. Talleyrand has sent orders to our Diplomatic Agents at the courts of the petty German Princes, to demand an explicit declaration of the line they mean to adopt, in the event of a rupture with Austria. Our minister at Ratisbon, Bacher, has also direction to lay before the Diet an extraordinary memorial on the same subject. The plan of the campaign is said to have been already drawn up by Berthier, Carnot, and Andreossi, and laid before Bonaparte. It is reported to be the same as that of 1800, with the exceptions of some alteration rendered necessary by the movements and menaces of Russia. It is generally believed here that Hanover is to be evacuated by our troops and occupied by Prussia, and that the line of neutrality will extend as far as last war, perhaps so as to include Frankfort on the Main. Two Senators from that city are now negociating with Talleyrand on the subject. The ci-devant army of England is to be called the army of Austria. The command has been offered to Massena, M'Donald, and Brune, who are said to have declined it. Jourdan, Berthier, Soult, D'Avoust and Marmont, are now mentioned as those who are to have prominet situations in our armies.—A considerable ferment is said to prevail in Switzerland and the Grisen republic. Several suspected Swiss have been seized by our government, who will be kept as hostages for the fidelity of their countrymen. Our conscripts desert in great numbers, and therefore cordons of gens d'armes are formed on the Swiss, German and Batavian frontiers, to intercept their flight. Several bodies of conscripts have also assembled in the Western Departments, and particularly in la Vendee, but a flying column of 12,000 men, detached from the army of Augereau, is said to be on its march to these departments, and will therefore soon re-establish order and disperse the disaffected."

We learn, with the most cordial satisfaction, that government has not only received a positive assurance of the de-