politics is sufficient to shew, that there may be very great profit in many branches of trade, without our being the carriers. Would Adam Smith, the great writer upon the wealth of nations, maintain that it was advantageous for British merchants to prevent the importation of a cargo, merely because it was not conveyed in a ship belonging to the country from whence it was fetched, or in a British ship? In time of war, a neutral would not give a preference to a British ship, nor indeed employ it, because from the hazard of capture, and the consequent high rate of insurance, it must be much more expensive than a neutral ship. In fact, to refuse admission to foreign ships carrying cargoes, by which a British merchant might gain, would be to prevent the supply of British wants, because Britons could not so safely or conveniently be the carriers. On that principle, the country must want useful and agreeable commodities, merely that they may not be conveyed by foreigners; a principal diametrically opposite to the interest of the British merchants; and to the convenience, or benefit of British consumers.

But let us consider the second position of his lordship, that the deviation is prejudicial to our nautical force. Did the employment of those foreign ships and sailors diminish the number of British ships and sailors? Were there, in consequence, British vessels and seamen unoccupied? Did not our trade, and navy engage every native mariner? If so, instead of the imports of commodities in neutral bottoms, navigated by foreign sailors, being detrimental to British trade and navigation, they were beneficial, in the direct proportion of the addition made to commerce by the cargoes thus imported. They enabled our merchants to carry on all that surplus of trade, which, by the letter of the navigation laws, would have been lost to Britain; and they afforded this advantage to trade and finance, while our own sailors were otherwise engaged, both in commerce and defence. These foreign carriers, whom we employed during the suspension of the navigation system, were so far from injuring our naval service, that they promoted the increase of our seamen in manning the navy; they enabled us to spare a much greater number of British mariners from the employment of trade for the objects of war.

In our former wars with the maritime powers, there was a practical suspension of part of the navigation system; and we derived great benefit from having for our carriers, neutral, and even British bottoms, navigated by foreign sailors, and conveying commodities without conforming to all the limitations of the navigation laws. This was particularly the case under an administration to which lord Sheffield was uniformly friendly; and on whose head he bestows great praises in the very production which we are now reviewing. When lord North presided at the helm of affairs not only advantage induced, but necessity compelled Britain to deviate from the navigation system. In the American war, if we had rigidly adhered to the laws of the seventeenth century, we should not have been able to defend ourselves against the formidable confederacy by which we were assailed. We employed foreigners as our carriers; and thereby were enabled to employ our own sailors, and to maintain a war against three of the greatest foreign powers in the world. Britain being engaged in hostilities, with France, Spain and Holland, a great portion of her trade, both import and export, was carried especially to the continent, in Flemish bottoms. Thence, as every man conversant in recent history knows, Ostend and other ports of the Austrian Netherlands, rose to such a pitch of mercantile opulence, as inspired the emperor Joseph with the hopes of restoring Flanders to her ancient commercial and maritime superiority. This employment of neutral ships and foreign sailors as carrying traders for Britain, was diametrically opposite to the very letter of the navigation acts; and consequently, on lord Sheffield's principle, was unwise policy. But it appears to me that it would have been much more unwise, either by not permitting a sufficient number of carriers to be employed, to have contracted our trade, and consequently diminished our revenue when it was most wanted, or by drawing a great number of our sailors into the carrying trade, to have weakened our naval force and means of defence; and thereby to have endangered our property and national independence. In such circumstances, can any man who actually views them as they were, say, that Britain would have been benefited by a rigid adherence to the navigation laws; or was not benefitted by such a deviation from that system? The navigation laws are founded on ideas of what was politic and prudent at the time when they were framed; adherence, or suspension, is simply a question of expediency in the existing circumstances. In the American war, why was it prudent for Britons to trade through foreign vessels, and for government to permit that trade, though contrary to the navigation enactments? because thereby we acquired more trade and revenue, and could employ our own sailors for purposes which were necessary to the national welfare and political salvation.

In certain situations the carrying trade not only occupies, but must occupy the principal attention of all states which desire to be traders. It happened as a matter of fact, that the first and most distinguished traders of antiquity were carriers, because their own country was barren, and afforded not the means of export to exchange for import. The Phœnician commerce was manifestly a carrying commerce, much more than either an import or an export; and as they were supreme in trade, the mode which their circumstances dictated to them, was by political economists long regarded as the most beneficial mode in all circumstances. The same opinion prevailed long in modern times, from the chief traders of those periods; but it is now well understood, (however beneficial the carrying trade may be to nations that have comparatively little to export themselves, and to purchase imports,) that to nations which have a considerable surplus of raw produce and of raw manufactures, a reciprocity of export and import is much more advantageous than a mere carrying trade. In the seventeenth century the Dutch had become the principal traders of Europe; and theirs, from their situation and circumstances, was chiefly a carrying trade. Thereby they acquired very great riches, and means of naval strength, because heretofore nations that far surpassed in the means of export and import, had not fully or nearly improved their own advantages. In naval rivalry Britain fought to injure the Dutch in the trade by which they chiefly profited. This was the great object of the navigation system; and probably, in the relative state of British and Dutch commerce and maritime force at the middle of the 17th century, the purpose might be wise; but it would not from thence follow that it is the interest of Britain, at all periods, and under all circumstances, to be equally hostile to foreign carriers. Perhaps a criterion might be found for ascertaining the policy of adhering to, or suspending the navigation laws in the objects which it was proposed by their framers to attain, and which it must be admitted, were wise and laudible objects. The navigation code sought to give Britain a superior degree of commerce, and a naval power beyond that which was possessed by her chief nautical rival. Here, then, was a plain rule for determining the policy of any species or mode of trade and navigation. If any foreign commerce could be brought to Britain without interfering with our own commerce, and that foreign commerce was wanted for home consumption, or could be employed for exportation, it was, by all the private and public gain of that trade, the more lucrative for Britain. If it enabled rival powers to increase force that might be formidable to Britain, there was a political loss which might more than balance the commercial gain. But if it had no such tendency to raise a force dangerous to Britain, there was all the commercial gain and no political loss. If it not only afforded commercial gain, but allowed a more vigorous and extensive application of the national force, it was not only a commercial, but a political benefit; and in such case the suspension of the navigation laws was proper for attaining the very purposes which were proposed by their enactment. In considering any deviation, therefore, policy would examine circumstances and result, and decide accordingly. Certainly every deviation from these laws has not been prejudicial to Britain. From the employment of Flemish ships and sailors, as almost the only neutral carriers in the American war, it is certain that Ostend and other towns acquired very great wealth; but did Britain suffer from the acquisitions of Flanders? Did not the employment of these neutral carriers enable her to occupy her own sailors in war? Has subsequent history proved that British trade and navigation were injured by that deviation from the navigation laws? Were we ever so flourishing in commerce, at any former period, as in the peace which succeeded the war during which we had thus deviated? Was not our navy, at the same time, so powerful as successively to awe both France and Spain to a preservation of the peace which they fought to disturb?

The laws passed in the seventeenth century for promoting trade and maritime force were simply means towards those ends, and consequently to be maintained by legislative wisdom as long and as far as they answered their purposes; and to be dispensed with in cases wherein they did not answer their purposes. A variation of policy with the change of circumstances is a necessary result of wisdom. Accordingly, in the last war our legislature, by formal acts, deviated from the strict letter of the laws which had been passed a hundred and forty years before, when they found that the deviation promoted the original intent much better than it could be effected by rigid and literal adherence. This was the principle and spirit of the deviating acts in question, which were called forward by the peculiar circumstances of the arduous contest in which we were engaged with the French republic.

Against such a gigantic foe, every effort of national wisdom, power and energy, supported by national opulence, was necessary. A departure from the navigation laws to the extent, and under the limits of the acts of 1795 & '96, enlarged beyond all former experience our means of trade; and consequently all our revenue; and increased the number of our fighting seamen. Our force and our ability to subsist that force, was powerfully promoted by the modified dereliction of the navigation laws. The acts of the 35th and 36th were farther continued by the acts of the 39th and 40th of the king; and did not terminate till the 44th, on the first of Jan. 1804. The trade of this period, as can and will be proved from the documents, very far exceeded the trade of even the most flourishing period of the peace before the last war; and the pre-eminence of our naval power during that suspension, a series of splendid victories, unequalled even in the naval history of Britain, sufficiently evince. Facts the most striking and brilliant contravene every assertion that the suspension of the navigation laws is injurious to the trade and naval power of Britain.

But let us consider lord Sheffeld's reasoning to prove the impolicy of the acts in question. "For these laws," he says, "there was not even a pretence but what referred to temporary circumstances. During the late war, when, in consequence of the disturbed state of the two hemispheres, a considerable part of the produce of the world was likely to be brought into this country for safety and for a market, many of our trading vessels were unavoidably taken up in the service of government, it was thought adviseable for the present to suffer all goods to be imported in neutral ships, a great importation consequently took place of the produce of countries at war, as well as neutral nations; and the goods were permitted to be warehoused, both for home consumption and re-exportation; but though the laws to which I have alluded may have arisen in the whole or in part from such principles or such pretences, they are not therefore to be vindicated. Some of them afforded great advantages to foreign ships; in permitting articles of merchandize to be stored, which they did not allow to British vessels; and all of them in principle amounted to a complete suspension of an essential part of the navigation system, and were admitted I should think thro' laxity of principles, and a want of perception of the true spirit of our navigation laws." What is the amount of all these arguments? The laws were enacted on a pretence of temporary circumstances. This pretence is a state of war, which the writer admits to have disturbed both hemispheres, and that on account of the hostilities many foreigners were desirous of importing merchandise into this country, both for safety and for vent; when our trading vessels occupied by government could not be spared to such importation. Thence (that is because we wanted foreign articles which our own ships, being otherwise engaged, could not convey) a great importation took place, and in these circumstances the laws in question were founded; but they are not therefore to be vindicated. According to this reasoning of his lordship, laws, permitting and encouraging the importation, in foreign ships, of articles which Britain wanted and could not spare her own ships to convey, are not to be vindicated.—Why are they not to be vindicated? The noble author adduces two reasons; first, because they afforded great advantages to foreign ships; secondly, because they suspended the spirit of our navigation laws. The first of these reasons proceeds on a principle somewhat similar to one which was long supported by political economists, that the advantage to either of two nations from commerce, depends on the balance of trade in favor of the one or the other. This doctrine is now entirely exploded, because it is found that of two nations trading with one another, though the one should be a much greater gainer, the other may be so great a gainer as to render it very advantageous to continue the traffic. Indeed the opposite theory is as absurd as it would be if two private persons were to engage in an adventure by which the one could gain much more than the other, yet the other could gain much more than by a different employment of his industry and capital, the latter was to deem himself a loser by the engagement. It is the same with nations; the question to Britain is not whether another country obtained great gains by commerce with us, but whether we obtain, by commerce with that country, greater gain than we should do without that commerce. This argument of his lordship therefore appears totally inadmissible on the received principles of political economy; and is farther controverted by the actual fact, to be evinced from documents, that we have been, and are gainers by the suspension in question.

(To be continued.)

The following elegant tribute to the talents of Mr. Cooper is taken from the Boston Chronicle. Without meaning to attest to the accuracy of the critique, we feel a pleasure in introducing to the acquaintance of our readers a gentleman, whose dramatic attainments are unsurpassed on our stage.

—

MR. COOPER.

The following is an extract from a letter to a gentleman in the country, written the day after Mr. Cooper's first appearance on our stage:—

"I hasten to give you some account of Mr. Cooper's *entre* on the Boston stage. The celebrity which this gentleman had acquired exsited much public expectation, and the difficulty which took place among the players previously to his appearance, raised an encreased anxiety.

"Immediately on its being known that he was to perform, every ticket was engaged; and the house, at a very early hour, crowded in every part. Something wonderful was anticipated. A display of powers hitherto unseen and hardly imagined. Such a concourse of anxious and enquiring spectators were, perhaps, never assembled in the Boston theatre.

"The curtain rose—a solemn stillness reigned; Mr. Cooper appeared; the theatre rang with reiterated plaudits.

"Mr. Cooper is perhaps the most elegant person you have ever seen upon the stage. Of an height, form and age well fitted for the character he assumed; a flexibility of feature ready to give utterance and energy to every characteristic of passion; "an eye like Mars, to threaten or command;" a voice clear, sonorous and full, extending its delightful melody from "the lowest note to the top of the compass," without laboured exertion or unnatural force; a mind comprehending with facility the range and extent of the character, and giving every little shade of nice distinction with perspicuity and precision.

"If I may judge from a single appearance, practice has given him a perfect acquaintance with the stage. His look, his walk, his attitude—was the look, the walk, the attitude of *Hamlet*. A prince oppressed by grief, driven to resentment by unnatural wrongs, led on by the inhabitant of an unknown world, and feigning madness which distress almost made real; still wearing an unaltered dignity of character; insulated and alone, still struggling with the oppressive secrets of his bosom——found in Mr. Cooper an exact representative.

"To perform *Hamlet* well, requires as much theatrical talent as any character in the drama. It exhibits sketches of almost all the passions, running into each other like the rainbow's colors, and requiring in the actor a skill in the exhibition little inferior to the genius of the writer. Each particular part is difficult, but the combination of the whole forms a wonderful series of novel, bold, and astonishing exertion. The actor who *conceives* this part well, is entitled to great credit; but if he can give to this conception a living form, he ranks high on the list of theatrical excellence. Mr. Cooper is entitled, in both respects, to our profound admiration.

"The weight of Shakespeare's language demands the closest regard. Under skilful management, it exhibits energy with ease, and the nice modulation of measure with all the majesty of strength; with the ignorant it sinks below the mediocrity of prose. Like the bow of William the Conqueror, it is difficult to bend, but when properly drawn, its effect is proportioned to its force.

"It is sufficient to say, Mr. Cooper has a perfect familiarity with Shakespeare's muse.

"The tragedies of Shakespeare fall away in the last acts, but nothing flags in the hands of Mr. Cooper. He seems to rise in greatness as the play proceeds. Terror sees its counterfeit presentment: Doubt hovers on his brow: Anger flashes from his eye; and rage, distraction, love, contempt, alternately assume appropriate forms.

"In his soliloques, what wonderful expression. In dialogue what appropriate modulation. To select what is best would indeed be impossible: as well might you determine what sun beam darts the liveliest ray.

"Do any censure Cooper? Yes: as they censured Garrick. They went to see a play; but it was all real. Any body who had seen a ghost would have done the same; and a crazyman must have conducted with his female lover as the mad *Hamlet* with the sweet *Ophelia*. He realizes his own sentiments—we may indeed say: What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, *in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an Angel, in apprehension how like a God.*"

Foreign Intelligence.

LONDON, March 2.

Some more Hamburgh papers came to hand yesterday, from which we have given a few extracts in our last page.—They confirm all we have hitherto stated relative to the difference between the French government and the Ottoman Porte, in consequence of the becoming determination of the latter not to recognize the usurped Imperial title of the Corsican Tyrant.

In the present state of Continental politics, it may be considered as somewhat extraordinary that the Ottoman Porte, longer and more intimately connected with France than with any other of the European powers, should, in refusing to recognize the new Emperor, have been among the first to set an example to which the power of that enfeebled state was not sufficient to give weight, if its object were of any importance, while all the rage and violence of the pretender were to be dreaded, in revenge for the denial of his claim. It is obvious, however, that this refusal has been dictated by the Court of Petersburgh; and, from the arrangaments which are now upon the tapis, we are induced to cherish the fond hope that it will prove the prelude to a general determination, actively to oppose the common enemy of Europe.—We shall resume this subject in a few days, for the purpose of taking a review of the relative situation of the different powers of the continent. In the mean time, we must observe, that there is no doubt of Bonaparte being deterred from carrying his threats against Naples into execution. It is expressly stated in the above papers, that the court of Naples will be disposed to presevere in that system of neutrality which it has hitherto observed, as the French Commander in Chief, by the express consent of Bonaparte, has given assurance, that the French troops will not pass the stipulated line of demarcation, unless compelled by unforeseen hostile attempts.

CONSTANTINOPLE, Dec. 30.

The French minister, M. Talleyrand, has transmitted a Note to the Turkish Ambassador at Paris, Haleb Effendi, of which Marshall Brune, a short time before his departure from Constantinople, delivered a copy to the Reis Effendi.—This note expresses surprise at the refusal of the Porte to acknowledge the Emperor of the French; since France has ever been the oldest and most sincere friend of the Porte. The causes of this conduct are then adverted to, and it is ascribed to a faction in the Turkish ministry, inimical to the true interests of the Empire, which has had the art to procure the rejection of all advantageous propositions on the part of France, and to connect the Porte with that power. In conclusion, it is asserted, that the present conduct of the Porte is inconsistent with its former Musulman dignity, which would never suffer it, to render itself dependent on, and subject to, any foreign power, without well founded motives. On the communication of this note, the Reis Effendi declared, that with respect to the refusal of acknowledgment of the Emperor Napoleon, the Porte had been guided by the protestations of other powers.

PLYMOUTH, March 7.

Came in the Spanish ship Sacra Famia, from Vera Cruix for Cadiz, laden with sugar, logwood, other goods, & 149,000 dollars and one box of gold; she was taken on the 16th ult. off the Western Islands, by the Pallas, of 32 guns, capt. Cochrane. The Pallas has also captured, and is coming home with the Spanish ship Fortuna, from Vera Cruix to Cadiz, laden with spices of all kinds, mahogany, logwood, &c. 432,000 dollars and two cases of gold images; captured off the Western islands, on the 15th ultimo.

PARIS, Feb 21.

The Arch Chancellor of the Germanic Empire reached Carlsruhe in the morning of the 15th, and alighted at the Electoral Palace. He had a long conference with the Elector of Baden, and dined with his highness and his family. In the evening he continued his journey by way of Pforzheim to Aschaffenburg.

HAMBURGH, Feb. 8.

The courts of Vienna and Berlin have commenced a negociation, which will probably lead to a more intimate connection between the two powers. It appears that they are not disposed to embroil themselves with respect to the new changes in Italy, but they are desirous of preventing the interference of foreign powers in the affairs of Germany.

MADRID, Feb. 8.

Admiral Gravina, late Ambassador in France, has arrived in this city. He has had several conferences with the Prince of Peace and the minister of marine.

The last account from Cadiz mentions the arrival of a reinforcement of 600 men at Gibraltar, and state that a con-