Grand Visier, when these accounts came away, had orders to march against the Banditti in Romelia with a formidable force, of which 40,000 men were actually pushing forward to Adrianople, it is also said, that the Sanjiack Bey had broke up from Constantinople with the bloody standard to encourage the true Mussulmen to join the expedition against the robbers.

The East-India Company have made a patriotic offer, which has been accepted by Government. They are to furnish six ships, completely manned, for the service of the state.

A camp of 15,000 men will, it is said, be formed towards the end of this month, about five leagues from Brussels, on the road to Namur.

We learn from Brest, that the minister of Marine has sent orders to Messrs. Lapon, Moras, Solminihac, Valteir, Rosamet, Lestance, Deshautours, Penieres, Clavio, and Saint-Crique, officers of marine, to set out for Boulogne.

Private letters from Paris, communicate some particulars, which if true, are important, viz. that it is the design of Bonaparte not only to invade Great Britain and Ireland, but to attack Malta and Gibraltar at the same time—and that a force of 120,000 men is now assembled in Languedoc, Provence and Italy, for carrying these schemes into effect. Near Toulon and Marseilles are 23,000 men, of whom 1500 are horse artillery, equipped for a foreign expedition. Bonaparte in his next tour, it is added, is to visit St. Maloes & Bordeaux, as well as Brest.

At the first audience given to the ambassadors after Bonaparte's return, the Bailli de Ferretta presented his credentials as minister plenipotentiary from the order of Malta.

The report of a triple alliance of the northern powers with France, which we stated early last week, upon the credit of mercantile letters, is again repeated in an article from Frankfort; but without any corresponding circumstance to support it.

It is a circumstance deserving of remark, that the king of Prussia and the emperor of Russia, in the negociations which are now pursued with activity between these two Sovereigns, treat without the intervention of their respective ministers, and even write their own dispatches.

The number of the English confined in Holland is said to amount to 1300 persons. Among them are persons who have been settled near 50 years in Holland, particularly at Flushing. The French General has declared to those victims of consular fury, that he will take their wives, children, and property under his own protection. Those who have seen, felt, or heard, what French protection means, will easily construe the meaning of this polite assurance.

From Hanover we learn, under date of the 2d inst. that the French intend to overwhelm that country with 8000 men more of their reserve. The troops who arrived there were generally ragged, and only sent to be equipped and fed at the expence of the states. Two columns of French troops, it is stated, are to pass through Munster, in Westphalia, to occupy the district of Gottingen.

MESSINA, July 29.

The new Grand Master of Malta having been prevented by circumstances from repairing to his island, has here solemnly taken possession of the dignity to which he has been promoted. This ceremony took place the day before yesterday, after the usual manner, in presence of an assembly of the knights of the order. The Bailley Trotti, the senior of those who were present, received the oath of the Grand Master, TOMMASI. Tommasi immediately proceeded to appoint the Chevalier *Busy*, lately arrived from Malta, ambassador of the Order at Rome, instructing him, at the same time, to make no delay in repairing to his post.

The Grand Master of Malta, after his installation on the 27th of June addressed the knights of the Order in the following terms:

"Having been elected by the Holy See, to whom we offer up thanks and acknowledgments of our gratitude, to occupy the Grand Mastership of the Holy Military Order of Jerusalem, we are bound to exert all our efforts to render ourselves worthy of such an honorable choice. When, left to ourselves alone—what are we able to do? What, can we do if deprived of the assistance, the zeal and the wisdom of the antient members of the order? The object now in view is to re-unite and re-organise a body, the members of which are dispersed, and the laws which governed them have been left almost entirely unenforced for the space of five years. Such, my dear brethren, are the motives which have induced us to call together the Sacred Council, agreeably to the forms prescribed by our statutes, which we have bound ourselves uniformly and invariably to obey. It is far from our intention, my beloved brethren, to call up to your recollection the lamentable events of the past, and the fatal causes which have plunged the Order into a sea of troubles, from which it has been extricated by the vigorous hand of the virtuous monarch, to whom we owe an eternal gratitude; we have now only to attend to the salutary means by which we may aspire to the glory of restoring to its former splendor an Order which, during the lapse of seven centuries, has attracted the beneficent regard of Sovereigns, and merited the esteem of nations. And you, my beloved brethren, who with me constitute the Holy council of the Order, bring to your recollection, in all your deliberations, the duties to which you are bound by the oath which you have just taken before us, and in the presence of God who sees, weighs, rewards, and punishes all. Yours is the proud lot to re-unite the sacred bonds of our institution—bonds which, through religion and honor only, may acquire a durable solidity. These bonds consist in a complete oblivion of private interests, which are the bane of all associations, that you may devote yourselves solely to the public interest, in obedience to the statutes, in the inviolability of the laws, in harmony among ourselves, in integrity, courage and perseverence. Convinced that we shall find in all of us the influence of those noble sentiments which will restore to us our ancient lustre, which will confirm in their benevolent intentions the governments that are already decidedly in our favor, and which will secure to us the protection of every other government, we shall continue to live in the cheering hope of our future glory."

June 29.

All the knights of the Order of St. John, of Jerusalem, who are at this place, were assembled yesterday by the Grand Master, in the Priorial church of the order. It was the first public assembly that he has convoked: he there went through the first of the operations which are necessary to restore to the Order its existence, and its antient statutes. He first ordered the Pontifical Bull of his election to be read; that being concluded, he arose, and advancing placed himself on his knees, before the two most ancient Baillies; and between their hands he took the accustomed oath. On his return to his seat the Baillies were permitted to kiss his cheek; the knights and masters were allowed only to kiss his hand. The ceremony finished by an exhortation of the Grand Master to the Order, enjoining them to exhibit that union which was so necessary in the career which they had to pursue; and to display a constancy and courage, such as would fortify in their beneficent intentions, the governments which had declared themselves in their favor. M. De Busey, charge d'affairs of the Order, at the court of Rome, has gone to Italy.

LONDON, August 18.

By a gentleman of his Majesty's Navy, just arrived from a cruize on the Flemish coast, and who picked up an open boat which escaped from Flushing on Thursday last, on board of which were several men who had fled from the requisition, we learn that, in the course of a few weeks before, the French had shot sixteen or eighteen of their countrymen, who had exhibited a degree of tardiness in obeying the injunctions of the French Government. The gentleman adds, that several ship-builders had been ordered to construct gun-boats, to be employed against this country. Three gun-boats, were actually laid down, but, one of the builders refused to obey his orders, unless he was furnished with wood and nails. At the time the boat escaped, the buoys in the Duerloo channel had not been removed, but it was understood from the French pilots that that measure would soon be adopted, as they were fearful of a visit from the British.

Yesterday afternoon another mail, the only one due, arrived from the North. The intelligence brought by it wears the same complexion as the accounts laid before our readers yesterday; and every thing tends to confirm the opinion, that a powerful confederacy will, ere long, be formed against our restless enemy—the enemy of Europe.

We observe in the Hamburgh Correspondenten of the 9th and 13th, two paragraphs copied from the Haerlam Courant, which do not seem to be ordinary articles; they are both under the head of Brussels. In the one it is stated, that the mediation of Russia is not expected to be attended with success, though it has been accepted by the belligerent powers, because France insists on a basis rejected by England, to wit, an armistice, on the status quo, that is, allowing France to occupy the neutral territories she has seized.

The next shews that M. Lombard's mission to meet Bonaparte at Brussels was to negociate respecting the free navigation of the Elbe and Weser. In this it seems M. Lombard has not been successful. If any credit is due to the article, however, it proves that the king of Prussia attaches a just value to the freedom of those rivers; and what is more, that he is sensible that France has in fact shut them up; and it is on France that the opening of them depends. If the king of Prussia sees the matter in this light, it is a very important thing indeed. That he ought to see it in that light will admit of little dispute.

How miserably is the dignity of Prussia lowered by allowing the vagabondizing system of France to operate uncurbed in the north of Europe! Would Frederick the Great have permitted the French to have come to the banks of the Elbe and the Weser, without his consent to seize upon a neutral country, and to shut out a commerce most valuable to his dominions and to the north of Germany? Is Prussia a power in Europe? If she be, why surrender an influence so natural to her, so important to that station she has acquired? If Prussia suffers herself thus to be let down in the opinion of surrounding nations, the superior physical strength and resources of her neighbours will soon overwhelm her.—If, to use an old phrase, "every bird takes a feather," Prussia would soon be bare enough; and we all know from whence Prussia has plucked the feathers that now adorn her. Nothing can be more obvious, therefore, than the policy of Prussia to be the conservator of the peace and neutrality of the north, as well on a large view as for the advantage of commerce.

We hope it will soon be put beyond doubt that Prussia resents the violence of France, and is resolved to oppose it. A great deal might be done at Berlin at present; and should be done in the way Bonaparte manages this matter. To make Bonaparte distrustful of his neighbours, would greatly embarrass his operations against us, though we entertain no dread whatever of his attempts of invasion. On the contrary, we wish to see the question tried, and set at rest for ever. But at the same time policy requires that we should avail ourselves of every aid to limit that ill-acquired, ill-exercised authority which France, not to say Bonaparte, now possesses. If Prussia were to declare against France, it would be easy to take Holland. These, however, are only speculations, which we ought not to calculate upon. In fact, the stronger this country is, the more it seems capable of defending itself, and annoying France, the more allies it will obtain. Let us not sue in *forma pauperis*, like miserable outcasts and dependents, for assistance, and it will come. If we are to have a war, let it not be a measured scale of so much *per annum*; but let us do what we can with men and money in *one* year, if our expence should more than double any estimate that has been offered of its possible amount. On this occasion, we cannot forbear from chiding the vile, impolitic parsimony of many of our nobility. Is this a time for shuffling about the arithmetical quota of the sacrifices they should make for their country? *For their country*, did we say? We must use some other argument with men who, judging by all we have yet seen since the die was cast for our existence as a free people, feel none of that ardour which warms the bosom of men animated by true patriotism. Let them look at France!—At the fate of the French nobility! and then let them calculate whether an immunity from a similar fate would be dearly purchased by a sacrifice of even a half of their property? Can they hear unmoved, with the fate of the French nobility before their eyes, those threats of vengeance levelled so directly at themselves, by a people which has overwhelmed the throne of the Bourbons, beggared and butchered the aristocracy of France, ruined the half of Europe, and spread its desolating maxims over the world. If they can, we shall only desire them to recollect, that only 15 years ago, the French nobility had as little apprehension about their safety *as they themselves now have*. The French however, were buried in ruin as with an earthquake, that gave little or no indication of its approach.

The English nobility cannot say they have not had warning. If they fail in the duty they owe to themselves, their families and their country, at a crisis like the present; and if ruin overtake them as the consequence, they will fall unpitied—undeserving of pity!

Many stories are told to account for Bonaparte's sudden return to Paris, plots of the royalists, plots of the jacobins, plots of Talleyrand, &c. &c. May not his return be owing to what he discovered in his negociation with M. Lombard, of the determination of Prussia—of the hints he has got of the feelings of Alexander I. whose fleet is now in the Baltic? May he not suspect that every thing is not so safe either without or within as he had imagined? There is nothing solid in his power, but there is a great deal of solid power in the hands of France. It is no matter whether Bonaparte be sick, or dead, or dethroned, unless there be some security against the overgrown power of France for the future.

ATTENTION.

THE Washington troop of Cavalry will meet on Saturday the 8th October next at 10 o'clock in the morning, on the ground south of the President's House, near the Tiber, completely equipped, and each member provided with ten rounds of blank cartridges. It is earnestly hoped there will be a full meeting of the troop, as it is the day appointed by law for the Legionary review.

By order of the Captain,

N. LUFBOROUGH, Adjutant.

October, 5.

For the National Intelligencer.

Purchase of Louisiana.

The FIFTH enquiry is, whether it was not best to extend the purchase to Louisiana, instead of confining it to New-Orleans.

This enquiry will be made entirely distinct from the pecuniary considerations arising from the cost of the purchase or the value of the land. A discussion of this point will be reserved for the Seventh Enquiry.

Had the purchase been confined to New-Orleans, the whole western bank of the Mississippi would have been occupied by France or some other power into whose hands Louisiana might have fallen.

To insure the safety of New-Orleans would have required a strong military force, the extent of which would have depended entirely on the quantum of force kept up by the proprietors of Louisiana. This of itself would have been a great evil, even supposing that we preserved peace with the neighbouring nation. This however, is more than can rationally be expected. Adjoining powers, who are competitors for the same object, are in constant danger of being embroiled. Nor is it probable that peace would permanently have continued between the United States and the power possessed of Louisiana. Without any such sources of difference our short experience as a nation has convinced us that we are to expect occasional injuries from both France and England. Under the infliction of these injuries on the Mississippi, it would have been absolutely impossible to repress a resistance or retaliation on the part of our citizens, who, feeling their power, would not scruple to exert it in the vindication of their rights. The effect would have been frequent war.

Independent of rivalry between the United States and Louisiana, the Mississippi would have been the constant theatre of war between European powers. Thus, there is every reason to believe that at the commencement of the present war England would have taken it from France; and the latter would have reclaimed it at the end of the war: or it might have been given as an indemnity to some other nation engaged in the war. We know too well the little security that exists for respecting the rights of a neutral nation, to expect justice from any power involved in the contest. To be convinced of this, we have only to observe the present conduct of England, and we shall perceive that she might, had France retained possession of Louisiana, have blockaded the mouth of the Mississippi with the same justice as she now blockades the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser. Could this have had any effect short of war?

It is therefore, most evident, that the possession of New-Orleans alone would not have secured our commercial rights without a constant recurrence to large military arrangements, and most probable that their vindication would have occasioned the incalculable evils of war.

Can any rational being then hesitate to acknowledge that the possession of Louisiana, by which the entire command of the banks of the Mississippi is gained, and by which every source of commercial rivalry and hostility is cut off, is an event of the greatest importance, and one which will be productive of the greatest benefits?

The SIXTH Enquiry is, whether war with France or England, would not have been the inevitable effect of any other measures pursued either for the attainment of New-Orleans or Louisiana?

Had we violently possessed ourselves of New-Orleans, knowing the title to it to belong to France, on the ground of a privation of right by Spain, without remonstrating with France, we should have violated a plain law of nations, and have given her the right of retaliation. That a nation, confident of her strength, and unused to submission, would have tamely submitted to such an act, can be credited by no man. In such an event, whatever her interest might dictate, she would have felt her honor stained, and would have unhesitatingly resented it. There can, then, be no doubt that, had our government persued any other course than negociation with France, we should have been embroiled in war with her. This would have been the result, had the United States succeeded in taking New-Orleans.

But let us suppose, what is far from impossible, that our attempt had, for a time, proved abortive; and that in the mean time England and France had become embroiled; and that England had conquered New-Orleans and Louisiana. For whom would they have conquered them? In such event, it is probable, nay certain, that she would have pursued one of two courses; either, have offered us these possessions on condition of our entering into a treaty offensive or defensive with her; or have kept possession of them herself. To the first alternative, there is scarcely a possibility that we should have submitted. What then would have been the effect of the latter? New-Orleans would immediately be garrisoned by a strong military force, and a considerable naval armament would be stationed off the Mississippi. Is there any probability that a nation, so formidable as England, would have paid a greater respect to our rights, than a nation so feeble as Spain? If we can judge of the future by the past, we have every assurance that she would have trampled upon our rights with bolder outrage than even the Spanish Intendant. Our refusal to enter into a league offensive and defensive with her would have roused her indignation, and she would have found its gratification in immediate acts of hostility, or by acts of injustice would have forced us into hostility. To this, it may be objected that we could not be at war with both France and England at the same time. But the fact is that we have very lately been engaged in qualified warfare with both. They both committed, at the same period, great depredations upon our trade, and retaliatory and defensive measures were authorised against both. And this unfortunate state of things would probably have been the actual result.

War then with France, or with England, or with both, must have been the effect of other than measures of negociation. What would have been the effects of war?

Its moral effects I shall not attempt to pourtray. They are such as the heart can only feel; and all description falls short of their fatal influence on individual happiness. No calculation of pecuniary profit or loss can justify resorting to a measure which has produced by far the greater share of misery in the world.

Let us consider its pecuniary effects. The army proposed to be raised in the Senate was 50,000 men. Our present army, consisting of 3000 men, costs 1,000,000 of dollars under a peace establishment. Under a war establishment the expence would probably be augmented fifty per cent. This would make the annual expence of 50,000 men amount to twenty-five millions.

Our navy would require augmentation, which might be estimated at five millions, which added to the above, would amount to thirty millions.

These 50,000 men would be withdrawn from the plough or the work-shop. So much labour would therefore be destroyed. Estimating the labour of each man at 150 dollars, a loss would be sustained of seven millions and a half.

Add this to the foregoing expence and the amount will be thirty-seven millions and a half annually expended or lost.

One year the war would inevitably have continued. This would have cost twice the sum paid for the purchase; and have produced an additional loss of seven millions and a half. But the probability is that the war would have been protracted to a much greater period. Five years is a moderate calculation, when we consider the common length of wars. The fruits of such a war would have been an expence of 150 millions, and an additional loss of thirty-seven and a half millions.

FRANKLIN.

(To be continued.)

TO COTTON MANUFACTURERS.

THE Subscriber offers to make the following machinery, and to set them to work in any part of the United States

Carding engines, either single or double, with flat cards or top rollers, as may be required, and the cylinders of any length from 20 to 32 inches.

Drawing frames, with as many systems as shall be required—each system having three or four heads, (according as they are ordered) will draw from 20 to 25lb. of cotton per day.

Roving frames, with any number of heads, each having two roving cans, will rove from 20 to 25lb. per day.

Water spinning frames, of 84 spindles; (42 on each side) which will spin from two to two and a half hanks on each spindle per day, the hank being 840 yards in length.

Mules, of from 60 to 216 spindles each, which will spin by an experienced hand, from one to one and a half hanks per spindle, daily.

Twisting frames, to double and twist the yarn into two or three threads, for stockings fringes, netting, tambouring, &c.

Looms, for weaving any width with the fly shuttle, either single or double boxes.

Warping mills, either woollen, cotton or linen yarn.

The above machinery will be made and set to work in any part of the United States, by the subscriber, who has served an apprenticeship to the above business, in Manchester, and followed it for twenty two years.

Any person who may want any of the above machinery, may see the same kind at work, at his manufactury, Upper Derby, Delaware county, seven and a half miles from Philadelphia, where they will receive any satisfaction as to the price, when the size and quality of the machinery wanted shall be described; and letters from the country directed to the care of the Editor of the Aurora will be duly attended to.

PETER ELTONHEAD.

Philadelphia July 13 †

NOTICE.

FOR Sale One hundred and fifty acres of land, One hundred acres of which is in wood—it is situated within six miles of the Eastern Branch ferry. For terms apply to

MICHAEL LOWE.

Prince George county, July 22. 3taw