of our manufactures, and the reduction of the public burthens, the faction already wicked, became desperate; and war with all its horrors, was willingly offered as the means of producing a change in the administration. The distorted features of their profligate policy became visible through the thin veil of affected patriotism.—Their sanguinary projects, their wild and visionary schemes, were detected and exposed by a republican phalanx, whose march has been firm and dignified; whose path has led to peace, liberty, and an extension of empire. The calumnies of federalism have appeared in their genuine deformity—the productions of their leaders have proved to be but the dreams of *lying prophets*. The republican Jefferson has been pronounced a *disorganizer*;—and yet he has acquired and will ere long *organize* a territory capable of adding new and flourishing states to our confederation. He has been accused of being *unfriendly to commerce*—By his wise and prudent policy, the commerce of the fairest and most promising part of the union has been secured. He has been represented as unfriendly to the interests, and disposed to abandon the rights of the western country. The memorial presented by Mr. Livingston—the mission of Monroe, and the success of the negociation, have falsified these base aspersions. His enemies have accused him of a wish to excite dissentions between the eastern and southern states, and ultimately to dismember the union—Under his administration the bonds of union have been strengthened; and the *productive* and *carrying* states united by removing every obstacle to commerce, by securing a safe road for our shipping on every sea, and of a profitable market for our productions in every port. It has been insinuated that he was unfriendly to religion. Let the religious society which has been persecuted, or the religious opinion which has been proscribed, or the individual who has been restrained in his devotions, be produced in proof of the assertion. With an administration thus tolerant, attached to the constitution, alive to the interest of all the states, friendly to manufactures and commerce, and pursuing a system at once frugal and firm, but moderate and specific; is it not extraordinary that an opposition should exist?—Is it not astonishing, that in the western country, which under the late administration was almost outlawed—subjected to odious excises and oppressive direct taxes, threatened with a standing army to crush the genius of freedom, and curb the liberty of the press, and where fifty cockaded aristocrats lately lorded it over 20,000 freemen, the open advocates of that detestable system, few in number, and feeble in talents, should yet impudently ask the suffrages of the people, and aim at the first offices in our government?—The moderation which characterises republicans, and the hardihood of federalism, can alone account for the presumption of the pitiful remnant of the party. But let not their hopes revive. It is only by penitence, and a complete abandonment of their political heresies that they can ever hope to be admitted into the confidence of the people of Kentucky. The wounds inflicted on us by federalism, have been too deep—The benefits derived from a republican administration too conspicuous, to permit us to revert to the former, or withhold our support from the latter.—We are not to be deceived by designing federalists. We can distinguish between toleration and confidence. To the former the enemies of our administration are entitled—to the latter they can have no well grounded pretensions.

A PLAIN FARMER.

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.

HOUSE OF COMMONS, JUNE 20.

DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY.

On the motion being put from the Chair,

MR. WINDHAM rose, and in a very acute speech stated his objections to the plan of defence which the right hon. gentleman had detailed. He had hoped that ministers, taking a comprehensive view of the present situation of the country, would have come forward with some vigorous and effectual plan of national defence. He had, however, found himself most grievously disappointed.—With every thing that had been said on the novelty of our situation, with all that had been stated of the unprecedented perils to which we were exposed, with every thing that had been urged in favor of the propriety of extraordinary exertions he most cordially agreed. He was the first man in the house to allow, that if we went on in our old orderly course, if we did not resort to new means of activity, arising out of new circumstances, and suggested by new appearances of danger, our destruction must at no very remote period be inevitable. His great objection to the plan which the right hon. gentleman had disclosed—he wished to speak out his sentiments on the subject fairly, and those sentiments were, that the system proposed went directly to cut up the existence of a regular army. Under the system which was now pursued it was utterly impossible that a regular army could be established; the reason of this was obvious to every man who, divesting himself of prejudice, suffered his understanding to be exercised on the subject. Without recurring to a variety of other circumstances which necessarily prevented the army from being placed on a respectable footing he would merely advert to the great cause of the eventual annihilation of a large military force in this country. This cause was the present system of substitution, as applicable to the militia. Bounties were allowed to an extent in the militia, which prevented the recruiting for the regular army having any thing like a reasonable chance of fair competition. The effect of the proposed measure was to add fifty thousand men to the existing militia, and, in the same proportion, to prevent the regular army from receiving any augmentation, or even arriving at a consistent, or formidable appearance. It was his decided opinion that the present system of substitution was incalculably ruinous to the best interests of the country. In saying this, however, he begged his sentiments to be fairly understood; that a rigorous inforcement of personal service should in all cases take place, he allowed would be a grievance altogether insupportable.—But this was no sort of argument in favor of the existing system. By permitting substitutes to be procured in the way in which they were now obtained, the price of the commodity was raised far above its real worth, and individuals and the country equally suffered. It might be asked, in what manner his objection could be removed? To this his answer was simple. Instead of allowing substitutes as they now stood, he would contend that individuals, who did not chose to serve personally, ought to commute their service by paying a certain sum to government, not to be employed in providing for the increase of the militia, but in adding to the number of the regular army.

The right hon. gentleman had claimed credit for the plan, by stating, that it would leave a large disposeable force applicable to general purposes. So far was he himself from entertaining such an opinion, that he thought the addition of fifty thousand men was precisely so much of a decrease of the means of providing a disposeable force. The fact was, and it was proper that the house and the country should know it, that the army, if the present system was persisted in, would gradually diminish. The right hon. gentleman in the course of his speech alluded to the necessity of reviewing and improving our present military system. The present was, however, represented as being a very unfavorable moment for undertaking any important improvement. He could not at all enter into this idea. If improvement was at all necessary, it never could be more expedient than at a period of unparalleled difficulty and danger. With respect to the quality of our army, he did not see much room for improvement. He saw, however, the most important considerations to induce him to wish that the army might be increased. This was, indeed, the great object which he wished to press on the attention of the committee. He had heard it mentioned as the first recommendation in favor of a book, that it would secure its being read, and on the same principle he would ever argue that the first and most essential love of an army was to let the country have an army. He had taken an opportunity on more than one occasion to state what were his sentiments of the militia system. He admired it in its own place, but could not agree to place it on the same footing with a regular army. It was contrary to the nature of things that it should ever be equal to a body of regular troops. The materials were indeed the same, but the mode of their application was essentially different. Without at all disparaging the militia officers, for whom, on the contrary, he entertained the most sincere respect, he was confident they never could gain over those whom they command the same ascendency which regular officers could secure.

With the views of mere defence a large regular disposeable force was highly important, but still more important was it with the view of any impression on the continent. He desired gentlemen to consider what would be the consequence if any of those changes took place in France, from which alone there was any hope of the restoration of all that the Jacobinism of the revolution had destroyed on the continent, to have it seen that we had no force to whom any power on the continent could look with any feeling approaching to confidence.—He was a friend to all subsidiary means of defence. But he could never too forcibly declare his opinion that the force confessedly the best in every point of view, was sacrificed to those of a subordinate order. He had no objection to them in their own place, but he could not at all admit their being admitted to the first rank. If after using every exertion to raise the regular army as far as possible, it had been found necessary to resort to the militia or to volunteers, this would have been all very well; but the order had been reversed. The militia had received the bounty which ought to have been given to the regular army.

The right hon. gentleman, after complimenting the zeal and services of the yeomanry and volunteer forces, stated, that however he might approve of that body, which answered very well for the purpose of police officers in the several districts to which they belonged, yet if he had any thing to do in arranging the plan of defence necessary for the defence of the country, he should propose a volunteer system of a very different nature, more efficient for all objects of national safety, and not by any means tending to interfere with the recruiting of the army, the supply of the militia, or the offers of service which independent and public spirited gentlemen might in the present conjuncture be disposed to make. This system would be, to put the people in a state of preparation for rising *en masse*, that in whatever part of the country the enemy might land, he should meet a peasantry army, ready to repel his approaches. To put the people in such a situation, it was not necessary that they should be drilled in all the minutiæ of military discipline, in the various modes of marching and countermarching, in turning their eyes to the right or to the left, or in those other movements, which he understood were not thought so material to the perfection of an army. He believed that men of very high military rank considered them by no means essential. It was indeed well known that they were of recent introduction into the military system.—They were quite unheard of at times when military atchievements of the first character were performed. There was no idea of them in the day of the justly famous duke of Marlborough. It was not then deemed of much consequence whether the whole of an army stepped forward with the same leg. It ought to be inquired into, how much of those innovations should be retained—all perplexing superfluities should be lopped off. The modern system of French tactics should afford us some useful instruction, and, with the aid of intelligent, experienced persons, the mode of selection might be ascertained. We might learn how to cast aside the nut and keep the kernel.

The consequence of a volunteer plan thus arranged and co-extensive with the population of the country, would be an exemption from any very material expence, while we might balance our force with that of the enemy, and still more, that it would prepare the minds of the people for war; for all men should be led to talk and think of it; military knowledge should be generally cultivated, and officers to be appointed in each district for occasionally commanding and directing the military operations of the people should be instructed to promote the conversations of the neighborhood in which he might reside—that in every private and public house it should be the topic of discourse. In short, those officers should make it their study to read clynical lectures to the people on the subject of war. He declined to follow the Right Honorable Gentleman (the Secretary of War) in his description of the dangers of the country, at the same time that he wished to renounce as damnable and heretical the doctrine which some gentlemen were so forward as to preach, that the country ought not to be apprised of its danger, that it was a subject of which it would be imprudent to speak much. What, could it be seriously considered unwise to inform the people of their actual situation? Could not the country even bear to be told of its danger? If it could not, was it probable that it would be qualified to meet that danger with firmness, or to resist it with efficacy? He strongly deprecated an opinion so ignoble, because it naturally led to an inference so mischievous, so dishonorable to the country, and so opposite to fact. He did not mean that the country should feel no fear, but he wished it to take a middle course between a too early fear, and no fear at all; to be steady and determined, not to be afraid of the danger which menaced the country, but yet not to overlook it, or to look at it lightly. He begged to observe, that he did not like the calm which was recommended. There was the calm of grief and the calm of fear, and the calm of a man who should put his head under the bed clothes to avoid the midnight robbers. This was the calm of non-resistance, and of course not that of which he could approve for the security of this country; but it was said by the friends of Ministers that, though thus apparently calm, they were exceedingly active in their operations; they had a great deal doing for the public safety, though nothing appeared. This nearly resembled the policy of Bonaparte: he was said to be making very active progress in his hostile arrangements, without any very considerable bustle or ostentation; and perhaps Ministers imagined that it was adviseable for them to imitate his policy *(a laugh)* but if so, he decidedly differed with them, for, though to be secret in preperation might be very good for those who hoped to surprise, it was quite the reverse for those who expected to be surprised—it would certainly be very strange in a commanding officer who apprehended an attack upon his camp, to send for his lieutenant and tell him so; but enjoining him thus:—"don't mention this circumstance to any of the soldiers; don't state it to the guards, nor let the centries know any thing about it." So, according to some Gentlemen, the country was to be kept in ignorance as to the extent of the danger which threatened it as to the preparations of Bonaparte, or the means taken to counteract their effects. If we were to be saved by the voluntary exertion of the people, how was that exertion to be excited, or how was it likely to be effective, if this system of concealment were to be persisted in; and what hopes could be entertained from exertions, if those libellous assertions were to be regarded, that it would alarm and discourage them beyond measure to be acquainted with the nature of their situation? Such unfounded and dastardly ideas should be abandoned, and Ministers should get rid of that dignified calm, of which their friends seemed so proud; for it was not by such ideas or such calmness that the public dangers were to be provided against.

He wished it to be understood that he saw nothing in the state of our affairs which should excite dismay. There was great capacity for exertion in the country, and ample resources, if directed with wisdom and energy. If the country would do its duty, there was no reason whatever to be apprehensive; but, in order to render that performance of duty effectual for its object, it was indispensably necessary that the government should do its duty, and that was not to be done by bringing forward such tardy and inefficient measures as that now before the committee, nor by such indecisive and neglectful conduct as had characterised the administration for some time back; a conduct so scandalously negligent as to encourage the arrogance of the enemy, and to weaken the confidence of the country. But without dwelling on a retrospect of the conduct of ministers, he would exhort them now to exert themselves for the defence of the country. Let them call upon every man of talent in the nation for his advice on the subject. Let not their opinions, however, be collected merely from private conversation, for men might be too much disposed in such cases to make sacrifices, in in order to flatter the judgment of others; to give up their opinions to the favourite plan of persons in power; but intelligent men should be applied to for written statements of their ideas. Thus their characters would become responsible, and many new and important plans might be obtained. He professed himself sorry that the first measure which ministers submitted to the House, indicating a disposition to vigour, should be liable to so many and such weighty objections, not because it was a force too great for the population of the country to afford, nor because it would be troublesome in the execution, but upon the ground that though it would be troublesome in a certain degree, and would tend to cut up the army, it would be inefficacious towards the end it professed to have in view. It was not efficient for the purpose of present defence, and it was fatal in its tendency to our future security. It was both in a political and military point of view, likely to be productive of the most fatal effects.

LONDON, July 4.

The Moniteur mentions that two departments, those of La Manche and Seine and Oise, have each voted about 31,000l. for equipping vessels.

The mayor of Amiens presented Bonaparte with some swans the usual present made by the mayors of Amiens to the sovereigns of France whenever they did the city the honor of a visit. "Louis XII," says the mayor, "received them graciously: the valiant Henry deigned to except them: to acquit ourselves towards you we have doubled the number usually given."

The prefect of Somme, in his address to the Chief Consul, introduced the following rhetorical flourish:—"Father of thy country, continue through our abundant fields, through our embellished cities, amidst universal joy, thy triumphant and pacific march—but let England tremble! Let the English, abandoned to the feebleness and arrogance of its ministers, to the folly and audacity of its orators, contemplate with affright the hero of France, advancing to punish perjury, to impose on the pirates of the sea the yoke of peace, and to proclaim on the ruins of Albion the commercial independence of Europe."

July 11.

Government has, we are assured, received authentic information that the wishes expressed by the court of Madrid to preserve a strict neutrality have been completely frustrated by the positive injunctions of Bonaparte, who requires every possible exertion on the part of Spain to co-operate in his views against this country, by the assistance of her navy. In consequence of this requisition, officially communicated to the Spanish government, orders were sent to the commandant of the marine at Cadiz, to prepare ten sale of the line with all possible dispatch for sea, and they were actually equipping at the Isle de Leon harbor. The intelligence reached government on the 25th ult. and measures were immediately adopted to strengthen our fleet in the Mediterranean. It was in consequence of that determination that the Malta and Canopus of 80 guns and the Sceptre and Conqueror of 74 were dispatched for the straights last Tuesday from the channel fleet. The blockade of Cadiz and Ferrol does not seem very distant. Notwithstanding the departure of these four ships, Admiral Cornwallis's force is adequate to the accomplishment of every object we have in view. His squadron, which is now cruizing in different points before Brest, consists of 46 sail of the line and the port of Rochefort is blockaded up by three more under the command of sir Edward Pellew.

In the event of invasion, the king, it is stated, will take the field in person, and will be assisted in the conduct of the war by a military council. His majesty certainly will, in the course of the autumn, review the various camps near London.

A letter from Amsterdam, of the 4th inst. says, "We are informed that the French government has demanded in the most precise manner, that similar measures to those adopted in France should be taken in this republic to prevent every kind of communication, direct or indirect, with England. It is expected that the exportation of every kind of provisions will be severely prohibited—orders are already given for the examination of vessels at their sailing, and for sequestrating all those whose papers are not conformable to regulations, &c.

Letters from Marseilles state, that a convoy has arrived in that port from America worth seven millions of livres.

CONSTANTINOPLE, June 6.

We are so accustomed to rebellions, that each new relation of this kind is not received with that dismay and astonishment which such events may be expected to produce. The 26th ult. the Porte received, from the commander in chief in Egypt, an extraordinary courier, with the unexpected and at the same time disagreeable intelligence, that the Turks in Egypt have been deprived of Alexandria. This important city is now in the hands of a corps of rebellious Albanians or Arnauts. These troops, the most valiant and intrepid in the Turkish army, lay in garrison, with others in that city. As a poor reward, however, for their courage and their service, no pay had been given them for some months past notwithstanding their solicitations and their murmurs. The Pacha, commanding in Alexandria, often regaled them, it is true, with promises, but as often forgot to realise them. The Arnauts at length grew impatient, and compelled their officers to conduct them in the presence of the Pacha, who, terrified at their menacing aspect, immediately issued an order to the Tefterdar, or general pay-master, to pay them their arrears. With this order they proceeded to the Tefterdar, who resided at some distance from Alexandria. Either ignorant or fearless of the consequences, this man in office arrogantly refused to comply with the Pacha's orders; excusing himself by saying, that there was no money in the chest. This was more than the disappointed heroes could bear; they began to mutiny against the Tefterder; roughly handled him, as well as those who were with him; and concluded their insults by carrying him, in irons, towards Alexandria.

The Pacha, who was perhaps not ignorant that his order on the Tefsderdar would be dishonoured, made preparations against the expected return of the Arnauts. Accordingly, on their approach, he commanded the remaining part of the garrison to shut the gates and to point the cannon against them: on which the rebels swore, in a fury not to be described, that they would either conquer or die; and, without suffering their rage to cool, they instantly procured some ladders, and other instruments, with the assistance of which they climbed up the fortifications of the city, spread terror and dismay, and in a few hours made themselves masters of Alexandria; a city which had been strengthened by both the French and the English, but which was now defended by Turks! The Pacha, as cowardly as mean, made his escape, with some of his adherents, out of a gate at the other end of the city; and the military chest fell into the hands of the Arnauts. Several persons however, were slaughtered before their fury subsided.

The capture of Alexandria in this accidental manner, through the bad conduct of the Pacha and the pay master, may, in this moment, produce the most important consequences, with regard to Egypt. The Porte, aware of this, hastened the departure of the Captain Pacha with his fleet. In short, they are determined to leave no means untried to regain possession of this ill-fated city.

NAPLES, June 17.

We have just received a piece of intelligence as important as agreeable, provided it be true. The First Consul, at the pressing instance of several courts, and particularly that of Austria, has assured the neu-