NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER,

AND

WASHINGTON ADVERTISER.

Vol. III. WASHINGTON CITY, PRINTED BY SAMUEL HARRISON SMITH, PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. No. CCCXXVI.

Five Dollars per ann. FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 19th, 1802. Paid In Advance.

For the National Intelligencer.

SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS

ADDRESSED TO ALL SINCERE FEDERALISTS.

No. II.

Fellow Citizens,

By the Federal Constitution, six important objects were provided for:

1. To form a more perfect union.
2. To establish justice.
3. To insure domestic tranquility.
4. To provide for the common defence.
5. To promote the general welfare.
6. To secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.

The first words of the Constitution, those which announce its great ends, are, "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves, and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

In these declarations, and the delegations of power which follow, the above objects will be found to be the fundamental ones contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, and by the people of the several States who adopted it.

It will be remarked that these are all general and national objects, which for their execution required general powers, incapable of exercise by the States in their separate capacities. Thence the necessity of a concentration of powers in a federal head.

But so jealous were the framers of the Constitution of the preservation of State sovereignty, that every department of the federal government is made dependent for its very existence, on the existence and will of the state governments. The President is chosen by electors, whose mode of election is prescribed by the state legislatures; he members of the house of representatives are chosen by the electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislatures, and according to the directions of those legislatures; and the members of the Senate are chosen directly by the state legislatures.

Here then is a dependence absolute and uncontrollable. The state governments may exist independently of the general government; but the general government cannot exist independently of the state governments.

This feature of our political system is first noticed, because in an enquiry into the correctness of all powers exercised by the general government, it ought never to be lost sight of. Its permanent language to legislators, is, "consider the state governments as sacred; they are the pillars of the whole structure; remove them, and the whole falls, the general government as well as the state governments."

Indeed it appears, that the object of the constitution was not so much to establish a distinct government independent of the states, as to establish one capable of uniting the wills of the states, and carrying them into effect, constantly subject to the control of the states in the above constitutional manner.

Holding this great feature in recollection, let us proceed to enquire in what degree the present administration have carried into effect the great objects of the constitution.

The *first* object was to form a more perfect union. This may be considered as a *generic* object composed of the *species* comprehended under it. Whatever tends to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty, contributes to form a more perfect union. How far, therefore, this object has been pursued and reached must, in a great measure, depend upon the subsequent examination into the manner and degree in which the embraced objects have been regarded.

It may not, however, be unimportant here to remark that at no period since the formation of the constitution has there been a more decided majority of the people on the side of the administrators of the government. Their conduct of the President elected by a majority of electors, whose election was afterwards confirmed by a house of representatives antecedently chosen by two years, in the midst of the administration of his predecessor and in the plenitude of his power, of a senate wherein there is a majority of 8 members, and of a house of representatives wherein there is a majority of 39 members. When, in addition to this it is observed, that twelve out of sixteen of the state governments are on the same side, amounting to three fourths of the states, and which represent in the ratio of numbers five-sixths of the whole population of the United States, there appears to be proof sufficient to demonstrate the fact, that the principles and the measures of the present administration have eminently contribute to form a more perfect union.

There is one other view of this branch of the subject, that, from its important effects on public opinion, is entitled to much consideration. It will not be denied, that governments and laws should, wherever there is a difference in communities, be the offspring of accommodation. Of such nature, it is acknowledged, on all hands, is the federal constitution. If the state laws who formed that instrument constituted such a unpromising spirit, how impressive is the lesson, to those who administer it, to yield to the same disposition. This accommodation may be effected by a mutual coffion of opinions by members of the same body. But this is of rare occurrence, as it will be generally found in practice, that majorities in popular bodies rule with absolute sway, and surrender little, if any thing, to the desires of their opponents. Such, in truth, has heretofore been our experience.

It followed, that for many years antecedent to the late change of the administrators of the government, what was denominated the federal party ruled with uncontrolled power. Regardless of the voice of the other part of the community, though frequently nearly equal to themselves, they gave their favourite constructions to the constitution, and excerciled according to their discretion the powers delegated by it. Thus the confidence & co-operation of their constituents were secured; and with the increase of their confidence and co-operation grew their attachment to the constitution, and of consequence their devotion to "a more perfect union." While on the other hand, from the ordinary operation of the common principles of human nature, it may be inferred that their opponents, generally denominated the *republican* party, became disappointed at the failure of all their efforts, and began in a degree, to doubt the adequacy of the constitution to secure the great ends it promised, or at least to question the probability of its ever being truly executed. Their dissatisfaction rule, therefore, with the exultation of their opponents.

Times have since changed, and the republican party has become dominant. Embracing a large majority of the people, they now see that the constitution holds forth no delusive promises—that it is the security of universal political happiness. They are, therefore, strongly attached to it.

Here then is a vast acquisition of numbers on the side of the constitution. The sincere federalists always have been, and must ever continue to be its friends. The republicans as a man have become its active advocates.

Heretofore only one side has possessed power, and we all know its charms even to the best men. Now both sides have enjoyed it. Must it not follow that the national satisfaction will be greatly augmented, and with that augmentation a more perfect union be established?

A TRUE FEDERALIST.

170,038 Acres of Land.

THIS body of land, in one entire and inclusive survey, is offered for sale to any individual or company, who may incline to purchase for the purpose of settlement and emigration. It is situated in the state of Virginia, on the Great Kenawha River, Montgomery county, and is distinguished by the name of "The Great Bent of the Kenawha," being interfected by the Piney river, Great and Little Blue Stone rivers, Coal river, and Spanlow river, as also by numerous other creeks and waters, running into said rivers. Numerous mill-seats, inexhaustible bodies of wood, and great appearances of ores, metals, salt springs and salt licks, are to be found on this tract, besides which, sugar may be made thereon to any amount, the sugar tree abounding in almost every part.

For fertility of soil, growth of timber, fitness for cultivation, salubrity of climate, and natural advantages, this body of land stands unrivalled by any tract of equal quantity in Western America; it will be submitted for sale to an entire purchaser, until the first day of June next, on very advantageous terms; after which, it cannot be disposed of at any price, the present proprietor being compelled to a division thereof. An indisputable title will be given, and for further particulars, as to terms of sale and payment, enquire of JOHN BECKLEY, Esq. Clerk to the House of Representatives of the United States, at the city of Washington.

November 1, 1802. tf

From the American, &c.

THE DEMOCRAT, No. III.

ON DEMOCRACY.

(Continued.)

IN all the different systems of the ancient and modern world, monarchial and aristocratic governments have been and are now formed with *standing powers*, independent of, and not responsible to the body of the people, and at this day, hereditary right forms the basis of them all, with scarcely an exception; the people indeed in some of them are still permitted to participate by their representatives, in one branch of the sovereign power; in which qualified form only, has democracy appeared on the great theatre of modern Europe except in the small cantons of Switzerland. But this mixture of a popular feature (as is justly observed by Barlamaqui) introduced into hereditary or elective monarchies or aristocracies, cannot authorise their exclusion from those classes of government, to which their predominant principles attach them (1)

Pursuing our inquiries we shall find among the modern authorities the democratic form thus distinguished by Montesquieu: *In a republic, where the people in a body have the sovereign power, it is a democracy; where the sovereign power is in the hands of a few, it is an aristocracy* (2). The same definition is given by Barlamaqui (3); and nearly the same by Vattel (4): Let these descriptions be compared with the constitutions of the United States, fee Bills of Rights of N. Hamp. sec. 8, 9, 10 & 11. Massa. 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9. N. York, 1. Penn. 4, 5 & 6. Del. 4, 5 & 6. Mary. 1, 2 & 5. Virginia Bill of Rights. N. Carolina, 1, 2 & 3, &c. Declaration of Independence of 1776, Preamble and amendments of the Constitution of the United States: In which we shall find the following fundamental principles established:—1. That all men are by nature equal in rights.—2. That all power resides originally in the people and can only be derived from them.—3. That all magistrates and officers of government are their fubstitutes and agents, and at all times accountable to them. 4. That the idea of a man born a law-giver or judge, is absurd and unnatural. 5. That government is instituted for the common good and not for the private interests or emolument of any *man, family, or class of men.* 6. That the people have an unalienable right to alter, reform, or totally change their government; and 7. And that they have all an equal and natural right to elect and be elected.

These are the leading and distinguishing characteristics of democracy:—*Sovereign power acknowledged to reside in the body of the people—not in a part—not even in their representatives.*—What the people do by others, morally and legally speaking, must be considered as transacted by themselves; their representatives or fubstitutes are therefore expressly declared merely responsible agents and their authority revocable; a delegation of subordinate power, wholly inconsistent with the idea of a sovereignty vested in them; and all hereditary right or *standing powers of a man, a family, or a class of men*, are expressly prescribed and forbidden. These considerations must decidedly clash the United States under the generic division of *democratic government*; nor does reason or authority permit a doubt that the democratic form admits of representation in all its branches; more especially if the authority delegated, is defined, limited, revocable and alterable by the people themselves: Montesquieu speaking of *democracy* says—*the people like monarchs and more than them, have need to be governed by a council or senate, and to confide in it they must elect the members* (5). Barlamaqui—*in a democratic state the people may commit their sovereignty to a class of men, are expressly prescribed*