NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER AND WASHINGTON ADVERTISER.

WASHINGTON CITY, PRINTED BY SAMUEL HARRISON SMITH, PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. VOL. CCXVII.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 20th, 1802.

FROM THE AMERICAN.

Some account of the House of Correction at Amsterdam, extracted from the travels of M. Thouin, into Belgium and Holland.

[CONCLUDED.]

M. Thouin made particular enquiries whether it was customary for persons after their discharge, to be confined a second and third time, as is but too often the case in many countries, for a repetition of their offences. He informed me that such instances very rarely occur; but the case is not without precedent, as he observed in the person of a young Jew, who was then in the Rasphuys for the third time. The case of this man is somewhat extraordinary. During the period of his detention he always conforms to the rules of the place, with the most scrupulous observance, and gives general satisfaction by his exemplary conduct. But such as he himself avowed to our traveller, is his constitutional propensity to thieving, that no sooner is the term of his imprisonment elapsed, than he returns with redoubled ardor to his lawless courses. It is not so much for the sake of plunder, as to gratify his irresistible impulse, that he follows this virtuous life; and M. Thouin adds, that he recounted his different exploits with as much exultation and triumph, as a veteran displays when rehearsing his warlike atchievements.

Another salutary regulation in this institution, from which the best consequences result, is the indulgence granted to the prisoners of receiving the visits of their wives and children, twice every week. Proper care, however, is taken to guard against the introduction of disease; and the ladies, in one sense, purchase their admission by giving a trifling sum of money at the gate, which becomes the pecuniste of the aged prisoners, whose wants are of a different nature from their youthful comrades. Thus the pleasures of one class contribute to the comforts of the other; and the entrance money, trifling as it is, keeps away a crowd of idle vagabonds who have no acquaintance with the prisoners. The ladies, at their visits, are permitted to eat and drink with their lovers, and when the conversation becomes too animated for a third person to be present, the rest of the company obligingly take the hint, and leave them to enjoy a tete-a-tete. By this prudent regulation, many hurtful consequences attendant on a total seclusion from female society, are guarded against.

M. Thouin concludes his account with observing, that the Rasphuys at Amsterdam bears a greater resemblance to a well ordered manufactory, than to a prison. It were to be wished, that all similar institutions were conducted upon a similar plan.

From the London Courier.

CHARACTER AND POLITICS OF BONAPARTE.

[*Concluded.*]

The army!—That vast and irresistible engine, is solely under the controul of the Chief Consul.—The composition, or indefinite extension, the disposition of it, are all in his power. The legion of honour is one of his great pillars; and a more formidable institution is not to be found in the history of any age in our country. It will begin by being the engine of the state—it will conclude by commanding it.*

It has been shewn, that the power of the chief magistrate is unlimited and without controul. But is such a constitution likely to be stable?—Bonaparte has discovered one talent, which we did not know he possessed—the talent of irony. He compliments the French nation upon the *stability* of its character and constitution. The compliment is certainly a little unfeasonable two days after the destruction of a former constitution, which he allowed them, in the same words, was founded upon the best principles, and was equally strong and stable.† But is such a constitution, we repeat the question, likely to be permanent?—That it is chiefly upheld by the personal character and talents of Bonaparte is undeniable; and this furnishes an argument against its stability.—His power is not supported by any of those progressions of authority, considered in themselves, and independently and permanently constituted. It is supported principally by offices of state. In this it varies essentially from most of the European dispositions, and bears a great resemblance to the Asiatic forms of government. Our readers know that the marked difference between the Asiatic and European constitutions is that the latter, possess privileged orders and a hereditary priesthood, whereas the former acknowledge no privilegied orders, and no powers that are not conferred by offices of state. To this cause may be ascribed principally the shocks and convulsions so frequent in that quarter of the globe. But though the system of Bonaparte may be stable during his life, what is the scene that is likely to be presented after his death? After he has given a military impression and character to the constitution, does he think that a Cambaceres or a Lebrun will be permitted of themselves to give away the full magistracy? Will the army, will the Legion of Honour, permit their Moreaus and their Murats to bend the knees to a Consul of Cambaceres' choosing? Does he, who is such an admirer of the character of Alexander, forget the conduct of his beloved Generals after his death? Did they guard the throne for his son and legal successor? Is there no room to apprehend that the army, after his demise of Bonaparte, will be agitated by contending factions? That the army of the Rhine will oppose the choice of the army of Italy, and the army of Egypt the choice of the army of the Rhine? That the Murats will intrigue against the Moreaus, and the Mesliennes against the Angeureaus? What is to prevent these shocks? The legislature? We have already seen of what avail the legislature is against a *Pas de Charge*. The Senate? The grand officers of the Legion of Honour, the General, and the Ministers, are the members of the Senate.

Is it therefore, without reason that we consider the present system as not likely to be permanent? We see that all the institutions of Bonaparte have an immediate reference to himself, and essentially depend upon his life. All that relates to the appointment of a successor, cannot but be considered as nugatory. It is not probable that Bonaparte will be in haste to name his successor, and every thing that regulates the appointment of one by will is idle. The will of Louis XIV. was violated almost before his interment, though he had all the advantages of hereditary right and a descent from a long line of Kings in his favour.

The attachment and obedience of the army will of course cease with the life of the Consul; the new Consul may neither have the power nor the inclination to tread in the steps of his predecessor; he may set aside all his institutions; the heir to his throne may not be the heir to his talents. He may be the tool of the army, instead of being the leader, and a Marcus Aurelius may again be followed by a Commodus.‡

It has frequently been said, that Bonaparte is a admirer, if not imitator of many of those heroes whom the pen of history, has recorded and immortalized. It is surprising that he should derive so little experience from their fate and fortunes. Some of his panegyrists have compared him to Alexander—others to Cæsar—others to Charlemagne.—The history of the Macedonian and Roman conquerors might, we should think, have taught him the fatal effects of a system, upheld and supported solely by one man; a system where the man is every thing, and where there is not in the State a principle of life independent of the life of the individual. The Generals of Alexander divided and distracted his empire. Cæsar, by a vain ostentation of power, says the Biographer of Cicero, destroyed the stability of it, and as men shorten life by living too fast, so Cæsar, by an intemperance of reigning, brought his reign to a violent end; and this is a lesson which history repeatedly inculcates; she teaches us that absolute Sovereigns are constantly exposed to conspiracies; that unlimited power offers temptation to ambition, whilst limited authority, though it restrains the conduct of the Chief Magistrate, preserves his person, and prolongs the duration of his power.

Other panegyrists have compared him to Charlemagne. Perhaps there is in their habits, their vigour, their activity, and their fortunes, a considerable resemblance. The historians of that period of French history inform us that the vigilance and attention of Charlemagne extended to every part of the Empire—he regulated church and state in the midst of war, descended into the minutest details, law into every thing himself, and was equally admirable at the head of an army, or of a council of state, of an assembly of the clergy, or an academy of learned men. But the policy of Charlemagne consisted in counterbalancing the power of the nobles by the power of the clergy and the free men. Where shall we find any such balance in the institutions of Bonaparte? Yet the fault of Charlemagne's system was, that is depended too much upon his own life, that he alone was able to wield it, and that after his death the kingdom became convulsed, his descendants were driven from the throne, and the sovereign authority passed into the hands of another family. Such have been the effects in those states in which the chief has been every thing.

There is a fourth class of men who think the resemblance to the fate and fortunes of Cromwell much more striking than to any of those personages to whom we have already alluded. Raised from obscurity to the highest honours of the army, Cromwell subdued the enemies of the Government by which he was employed, and having secured the support of the army, dissolved by military force, that very Government, entering himself with his soldiers into the sanctuary of the Legislative Assembly. He procured himself to be named to the Chief Magistracy, and, after the nation had been contending for liberty and a republican form of government, established a supreme power quite as despotic as that which the people had taken up arms to oppose. The army was entirely at his disposal, he narrowed the principle of the national representation, and rendered his own power unlimited; yet the nation acquiesced universally in his government, and he received congratulatory addresses from every constituted authority. "The royalists," says Hume, "though they could not love him, expected more lenity from him, than from the jealous and imperious republicans who had hitherto governed. All men, likewise, harrassed with wars and factions, were glad to see any prospect of settlement; and they deemed it less ignominious to submit to a person of such admirable talents and capacity, than to a few ignoble enthusiastic hypocrites, who, under the name of a Republic, had reduced them to a cruel subjection." By his able and determined conduct, Cromwell preserved peace at home, though in many instances he suffered and sanctioned the practice of arbitrary arrests and illegal commitments and detention in prison; he enforced respect and deference from foreign powers, even from those that had been the most intimate allies of the regal government. He changed the mode of electing a successor, and procured the power of appointing and declaring the person to succeed in the government to be vested in himself alone. He flattered himself that as his government had been strong, it would be stable, and that he should bequeath the empire peaceably and permanently to his son and successor. How well founded his expectations were, we need not say.—In less than two years Charles the Second was established upon the Throne.

We have thus taken a view of Bonaparte's policy, as far as it relates to the internal government and constitution of France.—It is in vain to deny that it tends, in the strictest sense of the word, to establish a military despotism. He has disappointed us. Yet, perhaps, we ought not to have expected, that he who derived his chief fame and glory from his military exploits, would not carry his military principles into the government of the state:—perhaps we ought not to have imagined, that he who had been accustomed to unlimited command and undisputed controul, would, in his civil capacity, submit to a division of authority, and to a limitation of power. To have confounded the devices of domestic factions—to have restored his country to internal and external peace—to have given repose to *Europe*, will always entitle him to the praise and admiration of mankind.—Yet still we may be permitted to deplore, that ambition and the love of power should so far have misled him from the path of true glory, and that he should have suffered the liberties of his country to have been offered up at the shrine of despotic rule. We may too be permitted to lament that he who has studied and imitated the great names that swell the page of European history, should not have cast one glance towards that bright luminary, whose parting ray yet gilds the horizon of the Western world.

Is it reserved for *America* alone to present to the world the spectacle of a man devoting his life to the service of the state—fixing its rights upon a stable and solid basis—rejecting all the dictates of personal ambition—wielding the power entrusted to him only to the consolidation of the liberties of his country—setting to his fellow-countrymen the example of obedience to the constitution he had established—resigning at length the supreme authority, and descending of his own accord to the class of a private citizen?

---

* *We refer our readers to the history of the Pretorian Bands, the Janissaries, the Templers, and the Mameluke.*

† *Proclamation of the Consuls to the people on the 13th Dec. 1799*

Foreign Intelligence.

From Bristol papers to the third of September, received by the fast sailing Fame, arrived at New-York.

LONDON, Aug. 28.

A Hamburg Mail arrived this day, brings the following articles of intelligence. Six ships of the line have failed from Toulon to proceed against Algiers. The envoy who is appointed to go with them is Citizen Hullin, who before the revolution was a private in the French guards, and was particularly active in storming the Bastile. It is said, that the letter of our Government, addressed to the Dey, is conceived in very strong terms; and that, entirely to root out that nest of pirates, we shall probably take possession of Algiers.

It is confirmed by the Jamaica papers, that a difference has taken place between the Governor of that Island and the House of Assembly on the subject of the demand by Government for the Island to undertake the payment of 5000 troops for its defence. The House of Assembly have pointedly resisted the principle, as contrary to their rights, and they claim protection, as their due, equally with every other part of the British empire. They likewise decline finding supplies for the maintenance of a corps of black artificers, thought necessary by the Governor for the execution of certain work resolved upon.

The heat in the neighbourhood of Frankfort, at the commencement of the present month, was so intense, that the leaves of the vine, and other trees, fell in the same manner as at the end of Autumn.

The rapid increase of Cotton Manufactories in the North of England has lately been almost incredible. Lancashire in, and perhaps will continue to be the grand centre; but one manufactory of this article has, within the last four or five years, been gaining much ground in Cheshire, Staffordshire, and Westmoreland; and so considerable has its progress been in Yorkshire, that the labouring poor in the western parts of this Riding, are at present principally employed in it. In the neighbourhood of Halifax, Huddersfield, Bradford, and even Dewsbury, several large manufactories have lately been erected, and we are informed the enterprising proprietors of these works have the most flattering prospect of success.

We are happy to find that the refractory ship-wrights have submitted, are again employed, and work together with the men from the king's dock-yards. The coalliers likewise have applied for permission to work, so that those unpleasant disputes are likely to be soon settled.