of giving to the state its legitimate weight in the union. They are entitled to the credit of the acknowledgment; but they object to the mode proposed in the bill. He was ready to confess that the choice of Electors by the people was the mode which he preferred to all others. But he could not accuse himself, nor his friends, of having deprived the people of that right; nor of having slighted the wishes of his constituents on that score. The present state of things did not admit of such a mode of election. It was a necessity, to which he was driven, to adopt the measure proposed by the bill, rather than the state should lose its weight; or than the constitution of the United States, and of this state, should be disregarded. It was therefore a case of necessity, which perhaps those gentlemen did not think so seriously called for this measure: But, in his mind, it was imperious; because it was called for by the people; rendered obligatory by oath; and injoined by the two constitutions.

A gentleman has endeavored to avoid this measure, as an invasion of the constitution, as an annihilation of one branch of the legislature. If no cases of a similar nature existed under our constitution, there might be a specious pretence for doubt on this point: But, taking it in another, the foundation of all free government; the will of the majority; it will not be questioned, that the minority are bound to yield to the majority, when the will is ascertained. That will then has been recently ascertained. An election has taken place, which has placed us on this floor; and in a manner so decisive, as to leave no question, with any man, on which side the majority lies. The will of the majority of the legislature is unquestionably the will of the people. The late election was made with an immediate and direct view to the choice of President and Vice-President. No voice could be more explicit, than that of Pennsylvania.

It is unbecoming to torture the meaning of a petition, as it has been done, to a sense different from its intention. The sense of the people is for an election, according to the spirit of this bill; because no other means are left to express the public will, on the great question which concerns the nation. Then, if we are not at all disposed to regard that will seriously; if we are not, indeed, determined to disregard that will, and the constitution we are sworn to administer; we must do it by a joint vote, as the only mode of declaring the will of the majority.

It may be objected, that this bill goes to make this house predominant over the senate. Admitting, for a moment, that such a design were contemplated; yet will it not be admitted, that even the sense of the majority would be declared. But the objection is futile. The mode of proceeding prescribed in this bill is already familiar to the practice of our legislature, in other cases.

They may further object, that, by this bill, a great part of the community will be unrepresented. But is not this objection pointed at the fundamental principle of society itself? It is a difficulty which cannot be obviated; for the minority must yield in every case; else confusion, disorder and anarchy ensues. In this house, the cases of the minority submitting are familiar and memorable. It is not very consistent, to oppose the principle on this occasion. This is moreover, no ordinary question. It is not a matter originating in an individual, and going to numbers. It originates in the many, and terminates in an individual. Here there can be no division of parts, to accommodate the passions or prejudices of the few. The vote must be concentrated and decisive upon one person. We cannot have an heterogeneous president, who like Nebuchadnezzar's statue, is made up of gold, brass, and clay. We must unite upon a vote for an individual; though we do it through the secondary medium of electors; and the majority must decide, who that individual shall be.

Upon the question of *Legislative* and *ministerial* acts, it appears that the gentleman handsomely surrendered the opposition to this bill; and objects to it only as to time. He has confessed the constitutionality; but objects to the circuity of the proceeding. But he has not gone far enough. If the spirit of accommodation and conciliation recommended in the governor's speech, is to be really regarded, it must be by the conduct and temper of those who have been adverse to such a temper heretofore. We have nothing to concede. Any overture made to us we are willing to adopt, but an opposition to the only means by which the will of the people can be expressed, does not appear to us to be strictly in the spirit of concession or reconciliation.

There are two grounds, upon which the present bill is maintainable; *expediency* and *precedent*. The expediency of an election is acknowledged by gentlemen who oppose this bill: but they attempt to give it a form, upon which they are aware we cannot agree, without relinquishing the obligations of our oaths, and disregarding the will of our constituents. Their mode is to give a representation to the minority, where the object is an individual. On the ground of precedent, the examples are abundant; but two are sufficient. Upon particular occasions the governor is elected by joint vote; and the State Treasurer, always. Yet the gentleman says, that, if this house and the senate were to vote jointly, the latter would be annihilated. If not annihilated in these two very striking and analogous cases, surely they are secure in the ministerial act proposed by this bill.

He says, we ought to do what the senate will agree to. We say, the senate ought to do what the people wish. We will suppose the senate to be composed of reasonable and conscientious men. If so, they will regard the voice of the people, and their oaths. The voice of the people they cannot mistake. It is too clearly and unequivocally expressed. By voting for the bill, in the present form, they not only obey the voice of their constituents, but fulfil their obligation; and maintain the constitution and that immutable principle, that the majority should prevail.

These are the grounds we stand upon, and such are the reasons which ought to influence an unanimous vote in favor of the bill. We must hear something to obviate our reasons before we can alter our opinions. We are ready to hear them if they can be offered. Let gentlemen come forward and show us better grounds: we shall hear them patiently and respectfully. If they convince, we shall act accordingly. If they do not, we shall, we hope, answer them liberally and plainly. Unless they do this, we cannot vote for this amendment.

The Yeas and Nays being called, on the amendment proposed by Mr. Preston, were, Yeas, 21. Nays, 55.

PROJECT

For a Perpetual peace by ROUSSEAU.

(Concluded from our last.)

I look upon it, as demonstrated, that, if the European congress were once established, there would be no danger of future rebellions; and that though some abuses would probably be introduced, they never could proceed so far as to elude the design of the institution. It remains now to inquire, Whether that design will be properly effected by the institution itself.

To this end, we shall consider the motives which induce princes to take up arms. These are either to make conquest, to defend themselves against invaders, to reduce a too powerful neighbour, to protect the injureds to decide disputes that canot be amicably adjusted, or, lastly, to enforce obedience to treaties. There can be no cause or pretext for war that may not be ranged under one of these six heads: now it is evident, that not one of all the six can subsist in the new state of things under a confederacy.

In the first place, all hopes of conquest must be given up, from the impossibility of making any; it being certain, that whoever attempts it must be presently stopped in his career by a superior force; so that he will risk the losing his all, while he is sure he cannot gain any thing. Every ambitious prince, desirous to aggrandize himself in Europe, does two things: he begins by strengthening himself with good alliences; after this, he endeavours to surprise his enemy unprovided. But particular alliances will avail nothing aginst a general and stronger one always subsisting; while princes, having no longer any pretext to take up arms, they cannot take up arms, they cannot take such a step without being perceived, prevented, and punished by the confederacy, which is constantly in arms.

The same reason which takes from each prince the hope of conquest, takes from him also the fear of being conquered: his dominions, guaranteed by all Europe, being as well secured to him as the estates of private subjects in a well governed kingdom; nay more so, even in the same proportion as their sovereign, their sole projector, is less powerful than the potentates of all Europe united.

There would no longer be excited a desire to reduce a neighbouring power, from whom there be no longer any thing to fear; nor would there even be any temptation to it when there would exist no hopes of success. With regard to the maintenance of the rights of each party, it may be remarked, at first view, that a deal of chicanery, with many obscure and confused pretensions, will be annihilated by the third article of the confederacy; which definitively regulates all the reciprocal rights of the allied sovereigns, on the footing of their actual possessions. Hence all possible pretensions and demands will become clear for the future, and be determined by the congress, as they occasionally arise. Add to this, that if my rights are infringed, I ought to defend them by the same means. Now as no one can encroach upon them by force of arms, without incurring the ban of the congress; so it is no longer necessary that I should by force of arms defend them. The same may be said of slighter injuries, wrongs, and reparations, and of all the foreseen differences that may arise between sovereigns. The same power which protects their rights, ought also to redress their grievances.

As to the last article, its solution is evident. It is plain, at first sight, that, as there is no aggressor to be feared, there is no need of any defensive treaty; and that, as none could be formed more solid and effectual than that of the grand confederacy, every other would be useless, unlawful, and of course null and void.

It may indeed be said, that sovereigns will, by this project, be deprived of the right of doing themseles justice, or of doing injustice to others, when they please; they will be deprived of the power aggrandizing themselves; they must renounce that formidable pomp of power with which they delight to terrify the world, and that glory of conquest from which they now derive honour. In fine, they will be reduced to the necessity of being just and peaceable. What will be their indemnification for the loss of all these?

I will not venture to reply, with the Abbe de St Pierre, that the real glory of princes consists in their promoting the public good and the happiness of their subjects; that their true interest depends on their glory, and that the glory they acquire in the opinion of the wise is proportioned to the service they are of to mankind; that the project of a perpetual peace, being the greatest that ever was formed, ought to confer immortal glory on its author; that the putting it into execution, being in like manner, the most useful to subjects, would be still more glorious to sovereigns; that this enterprize would be particularly the only one unsullied with blood and rapine, with sorrow and execration; and in fine, that the most certain way for a prince to distinguish himself among the herd of kings, is to labour for the public good. Such are the sentiments which, broached in the cabinet of princes, have brought ridicule on the author and his projects. But let us not, like them, despise his reasons: we have nothing to do with the virtues of princes; let us speak of their interests.

If all Kings are not yet convinced of the folly of making conquests, it appears, at least, that the wisest of them begin to see that they cost more than they are worth. Without entering into a thousand distinctions on this head, which might lead us too far out of the way, it may be said, in general, that a Prince, who, by enlarging his territories, loses as many old subjects as he acquires new, becomes weaker by his acquisition; because, with more territories to defend, he hath no more subjects to defend it.

I now leave the reader, to his examination of all these articles, and to form a comparison between the state of peace resulting from the proposed confederacy, and the state of war which results from the present impolitic state of Europe.

If we have reasoned rightly in laying down this project, it has been demonstrated, first, That the establishment of a perpetual peace depends solely on the consent of the respective sovereigns, and that there is no other obstacle to it than their opposition. Secondly, That this establishment would be every way useful; and that no comparison is to be made, even with regard to them, between the inconveniences and advantages resulting from it. Thirdly, That it is reasonable to suppose their inclination will agree with their interests. And, lastly, that this establishment, if once formed on the plan proposed, would be solid and lasting, and perfectly answer the end designed. We cannot, indeed, take upon us to say, that the sovereigns of Europe will actually adopt our project, (who can answer for the judgment of others?) but we can safely say, they would adopt it, if they knew their true interests: for it should be observed, that we have not supposed men to be such as they ought to be, good, generous, disinterest, and public spirited from motives of humanity; but, on the contrary, such as they really are, unjust, avaricious, and more solicitous for their private interest than that of the public. The only supposition we have made, is, that mankind have sense enough in general to know what is useful to them, and fortitude enough to embrace the means of their own happiness. Should our project, nevertheless, fail of being put into execution, it will not be neglected because it is chimerical, but because the world is absurd, and there is a kind of absurdity in being wise among fools.

LANCASTER, Nov. 14.

Messrs. Boileau, Penrose and Wilson, of the House of Representatives, waited on the Governor this day, and presented the following answer of that body to his address.

To THOMAS M'KEAN,

Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Sir,

THE House of Representatives, impressed with the importance of the extraordinary occasion, on which you have convened the Legislature, take this early opportunity to express their approbation of so seasonable and patriotic an interposition of the executive authority.

While the motives, by which you have been actuated, justly increase your claims upon the public confidence and esteem, we anxiously hope, that the honorable example of your conduct will produce a cordial co-operation in all the departments of the government, to rescue Pennsylvania from the stigma of neglecting the performance of an important constitutional duty, and endangering the energy and stability of the union.

We concur, Sir, in the general opinion which you have announced, that the appointment of the electors of a President and Vice President of the United States, by a general choice of the people, is the truest, safest, fairest exposition of the constitution; and we sincerely lament the necessity, which, even in a single instance, has imposed a departure from that rule: but as there is no alternative except a legislative appointment, or a dereliction of the right of election, the good sense of our constituents will discern the dangerous and disgraceful consequence of the latter course, and justify a resolution to perform the former. Under this conviction, we have given a prompt attention to your address; and guided in the present instance by the precedent which our sister states have established; by the obvious spirit of the constitution and laws of Pennsylvania, in similar cases; and by the very nature of the subject—we trust, that whatever may be the issue of this interesting session, there will be no cause, on our part, for self-reproach, or public censure.

We shall receive your future communications, on the general state of the Commonwealth, with merited respect: and be assured, sir, that all the means in our power will constantly be employed to preserve that liberal and harmonious intercourse between the departments of the government, which is so essential to the advancement of our private happiness, as well as to the execution of our public trust.

To which the Governor returned the following reply:

To the House of Representatives

Of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Gentlemen,

AS it is my constant study to merit the approbation of the Legislature in all my official proceedings, it affords me a sincere satisfaction to receive the present testimonial of confidence and esteem from the House of Representatives.

That the occasion on which you are convened is an important one, appears to be the unanimous opinion of every private citizen, as well as of every public officer. It involves the fulfilment of a solemn obligation to our sister states, and the discharge of an indispensible duty, which we owe to our constituents. Though, therefore, it is no longer in your power to pursue the most eligible mode of appointing electors, I am happy to find, that you consider the appointment as an act, that must at all events be performed, in any mode that the constitution will allow. Convinced as I am, that the virtual secession of Pennsylvania, by refusing or neglecting to give her vote, in the organization of the federal government, will be a vital stab to the union, under which it may, perhaps, long languish, but from which it can never perfectly recover, I wait with inexpressible solicitude, the ultimate determination of the legislature.

Yet, gentlemen, I cannot allow myself to despair. If the voice of the people is at all regarded; if their welfare is contemplated; if the honor of the legislature, as